

Theism as Life and Philosophy

DHIRENDRANATH VEDANTAVAGIS M.A.

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Theism as Life and Philosophy

BEING

A COMPENDIUM OF THE TEACHINGS OF
PANDIT SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAN

BY

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PREFACE

This little book has been written and compiled with the object of presenting in a compact form some of the views of Pandit Sitanath Tattvabhushan as they are set forth in his works on Philosophy and practical religion. The most important of these works are referred to in the body of the book and given in a list in the appendix. In preparing the Compendium the writer and compiler has been materially helped by the Pandit, to whom he feels deeply indebted for this kindness. It is hoped that those who have no time to read the Pandit's works, some of which are of considerable size, will get a fair idea from the following pages of his teachings on many of the subjects dealt with in them, and that others who have time for further study will be induced by reading them to make a closer acquaintance with the Pandit's views through his works, a full list of which may be got on application to him.

Apart from the general difficulty of summarising the views of a writer who treats of deep and abstruse subjects, the task had to be done in the midst of special difficulties arising from domestic causes. No one therefore is better aware than the author himself of the defects of the book. It is hoped however that inspite of these defects, for which the kind indulgence of the reader is humbly sought for, the book will, under divine providence, serve a useful purpose, and it is with the earnest prayer that it may do so that it is sent out.

For suggesting the idea of the book its writer and publishers are indebted to Sir R. Venkata Ratnam Naidu, M.A., L.T., D.Litt., through whose brotherly help and encouragement, as Pandit Tattvabhusan's friends and readers know, a large part of his literary work has been done.

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CHAPTER I

Theory of Knowledge : Intuition and Experience

When Pandit Tattvabhúshan began his theological career, he had before him two theories of knowledge,—two doctrines of how we know and what we know. One of these theories was the current and orthodox Hindu view and the other, somewhat different from it, the Bráhma view. He thought that neither of these was a true and safe basis of Theism and so set about combating and correcting them. The second lecture of his *Vedanta and its Relation to Modern Thought* and the second and the third lecture of his *Philosophy of Bráhmaism* give his criticism of these theories, while his *Brahmajñásá* offers a defence of his own theory. Of the current theory of knowledge he says on p. 70 of *The Philosophy of Bráhmaism* (second edition) :—“It is commonly thought that we know certain things by our senses, certain things by the understanding, certain things by conscience and certain other things by spiritual intuition, and so on, the number of faculties differing in different forms of the theory. Now, my theory is that the act of knowing is indivi-

sible, that just as the mind is one, so is its power of knowing one, and its object also one. I think that in every act of knowing the whole mind is engaged, and it knows only one thing, one indivisible object, namely, God. Sense, understanding and reason I hold to be, not different faculties of the mind cognisant of different objects, but only different forms or aspects in which the same object appears to us. In what we call sensuous perception, logical understanding, and reason or spiritual intuition, the same object, God, I hold, appears to us in a more or less complex form. Now, I know very well how startling such a view will appear to many. But I think it can nevertheless be made intelligible and acceptable to them." A short reasoned statement of our author's view is found on pp. 136, 137 of his *Lectures on the Theism of the Upanishads and other subjects*, where he says : "Some idea of this doctrine, that the apparently different kinds of knowledge,—sensuous, intellectual and spiritual,—are all inseparably connected and are really one, can be had from the following considerations. I can have no knowledge of the book before me without a knowledge of my self as its knower. My seeing or touching this book therefore is not mere sensuous knowledge, the supersensuous knowledge of my self being inextricably mixed up with it. Things seen, heard, touched, smelled and tasted can be known only in relation to a self which sees, hears, touches, smells and tastes. The converse also is true, namely that the subject of seeing, hearing, touching, smelling and tasting can be known

only in relation to the objects of these acts of knowing. Again, you cannot know this book without locating it in a particular part of infinite space. In the same way, you cannot know the sounds I am producing without thinking of them as in time,—infinite time. Lastly, in our knowledge of a world in space and time the idea of a mind in relation to which this world exists and which yet transcends it, for it can neither be extended nor flowing like it, is present as the very condition of thought and knowledge. We are not indeed always conscious of these implications of knowledge, but they are nevertheless present in it and come out clearly when we closely analyse any act of knowledge. Such analysis shows the error of the popular division of the faculties and the division of *pramáñas* in our native philosophy.” On p. 135 of the same book our author says: “This view is accepted even by some philosophers, specially our Hindu philosophers, according to whom there are three *pramáñas* or sources of knowledge,—*pratyaksha* (sense), *anumána* (inference) and *sabda* (scripture). By *sabda* our philosophers mean the spiritual insight of the *rishis*, an insight which every one following their methods of spiritual culture may share in.” The claims of an external revelation in general,—a revelation which must be accepted as an authority on spiritual matters even before it has become a direct revelation to the recipient,—and those of the Vedas in particular as such a revelation, are considered at great length by our author in lecture II of both his *Vedanta and its Relation to Modern Thought* and

Philosophy of Bráhmaism. The orthodox Hindu view of the Vedas as *apaurusheya*, not produced by any person and so eternal, as philosophically interpreted by Ácharyas Sankara and Mádhava, is expounded in the former book. This view identifies *veda* with *sabda*, word, and its essence, conception, and shows that conceptions or ideas are uncreated and exist eternally in the Divine Mind. *Rishis* or spiritually awakened persons are not their *kartárah*, makers, but only their *drastárah*, seers. This theory of the eternity of ideas or knowledge is accepted by Pandit Tattvabhúshan as substantially true and expounded in the philosophical portions of all his works. But it is the idea of a supernaturally revealed book like the Veda, the Bible or the Koran or a body of truths embodied in such a book which lies at the basis of the historical religions, and even the Brahma Samaj in its earliest days proceeded upon such an idea. Under Maharshi Devendranath Thakur's leadership the Samaj indeed rejected this idea, but the notion of a modified supernaturalism in the matter of revelation lingered and still lingers in its doctrine of intuitive truths. Pandit Tattvabhúshan subjects this doctrine, as set forth in the writings of the leader just named and those of Brahmánanda Kesavchandra Sen to a sharp criticism in the third lecture of his *Philosophy of Bráhmaism*. His criticism is mainly directed to the attempt of these leaders to set up Intuition as an authority to be uncritically accepted both by the wise and the ignorant, the thoughtful and the thoughtless. The Pandit shows that the alleged characteristics of universality, spon-

taneity and self-evidence cannot be attributed to the fundamental principles of Brahmaism, but that they are far from being universally accepted and that the recognition of their truth requires a good deal of philosophical analysis and reasoning. Nevertheless he accepts the doctrine of Intuition in the sense that there are fundamental principles lying at the basis of our experience,—both our theoretic and practical experience,—that is our knowledge of nature and of our moral ideals and duties. But the discovery of these fundamental principles cannot be left to uncritical minds incapable of close observation and deep introspection. It is possible only to a careful analysis of external and internal experience disclosing the ultimate synthesis of things and thoughts. The power of such analysis is indeed a rare and difficult thing, but it is indispensable to the attainment of rational religion as something clearly distinguishable from traditional religion. It is impossible to substitute a body of intuitive truths uncritically accepted for a prophet or scripture accepted in the same manner. Those who accept the former are as little free as those who accept the latter. True freedom in religion as well as in other matters is incompatible with ignorance and intellectual torpidity. Our author is tireless in his insistence on this truth in dealing with his theory of knowledge as well as in other parts of his work. The fact is, after all, that this distinction of intuitive truths, truths known directly on the one hand and inferential truths, truths known by an indirect process, is ultimately based on an abstraction.

Direct and indirect, *here and there, now and then, this and that*, are indissolubly connected, and cannot be known or thought of apart from one another. There is no truth which is acquired by pure intuition or pure inference. Intuition implies inference, and inference intuition. This will be evident when we deal with our author's view of Idealism.

Pandit Tattvabhúshan's reasonings on Theological subjects are all governed by the Dialectical Method of Hegel and his followers understood and accepted in its broad outlines. But in his works, which are all on philosophical religion and not on pure Philosophy, he has given no detailed account of this method. However, the seventh lecture of his *Krishna and the Gítá* and the fifth of his *Theism of the Upani-shads* contain brief accounts of this method. From the former we make the following extract:—"The logic that dominates ordinary and scientific thought, as well as the philosophical systems of the subjective stage, is what is called Formal or Deductive Logic, associated in Europe with the name of Aristotle. Its fundamental principles,—principles which it uses in every stage and department of knowledge,—are those of Identity and Contradiction. It fixes a thing once for all in its self-identity, distinguishing it from other things, and preserves it against self-contradiction. To it A is A and is in no sense not-A. That this is a necessary movement of thought, is undoubted. Ordinary life and thought would be impossible if we were to deny the natural distinctions of things and confound them with one another, for instance fire with water or

man with woman. But as soon as we rise to the higher sphere of speculative thought and try to understand the ultimate nature of things by the light of this logic, we see that it fails us. The puzzles and perplexities of philosophical systems are mostly due to the application of the laws of identity and contradiction to conceptions which refuse to be governed by them. The fact is that the differences of things, though real enough, are founded on a relation, a unity, so deep and subtle that it eludes not only the common understanding, but also scientific thought, and even among philosophers few suspect it and fewer still grasp it with any degree of clearness, far less formulate it as a logical principle. Fire and water are indeed different and exclude each other; but they are both related to each other by their common relation to the Intelligence which knows them and whose knowing constitutes their being. Their distinction is thus founded on a relation, their difference on a unity, their contrariety on an identity. However absurd therefore it may seem to the common understanding, there is a sense in which water is one with fire or is fire. In their oneness with the Supreme Intelligence which reproduces itself in our intelligence and to the absoluteness of which we may rise in our moments of supreme enlightenment, they are one,—‘*Abheda Paramátmani*.’ This is the Hegelian principle of the Identity of Contrarieties, of the unity of differences, which has brought upon itself so much derision from shallow minds in Europe, but which will no doubt find, as soon as it is understood, a quite different reception in a country where the *Upanishads* and the *Bhaga-*

vadgītā have inspired and guided the thoughts and aspirations of thinking and earnest men. The principle means that you cannot truly know a thing either in nature or in human history by merely fixing it in its bare self-identity. Its *being*,—its mere identity with itself,—is to knowledge *nothing*, for it discloses and really consists in differences, contrarieties, without which it is unthinkable and unmeaning. To know a thing truly, you must know also its relation to its opposite,—which again has its own opposite, and so on,—and to the Supreme Unity, the unity of self-consciousness, in which all differences are ultimately unified,—unified not by being merged in it, but by being held as differences in a Unity. This Unity alone is truly absolute, an Identity without contradiction, a Reality which, though containing infinite internal difference, '*svagata veda*,' is without external difference, without relation to anything external to it. Thesis, antithesis and synthesis are therefore the three movements through which the human mind passes in arriving at the true and full knowledge of a thing. They are not detached and unconnected movements, for in each the others are implicitly contained. Each step is only a progress towards explicitness, the last bringing the whole process to full clearness. In thesis or the simple apprehension of a thing,—wrongly called sensuous perception, for no knowledge is merely sensuous,—its difference from and relation to other things and the knowing intelligence is already implied. In understanding or scientific knowledge and in imperfect metaphysical systems, the element of difference is

clearly brought out, while reason or true philosophical knowledge finally reveals the necessary relation of all things to a Supreme Unity of Consciousness. This, in its barest outline, is the Dialectical Method of Hegel, which represents the high-water mark of western speculation."

CHAPTER II

Realism and Idealism

Pandit Tattvabhúshan's theory of knowledge,—the theory that nothing can be known except in relation to the knowing subject and that complete knowledge passes through the stages of thesis and antithesis to synthesis,—necessarily leads to a theory of reality which may be called Absolute Idealism, in which material things,—things in space and time,—and finite selves are seen as indissolubly related to an Infinite Self. As we can conceive and believe as real only what we know, the only possible inference from the theory that all things *are known* only in relation to the knowing self, is that all things *exist* in relation to the self,—that the relation between subject and object revealed in knowledge is a necessary and indissoluble relation. This is not indeed the *prima facie* view. Things in space and time seem to stand out by themselves without any necessary relation to the knowing subject. That the very statement of this view involves a contradiction, is not seen by unreflecting persons. That knowledge,—even the simplest knowledge,—seeing, hearing and touching &c.,—is a relation, a setting together, of subject and object, is not seen by such people. Philosophers indeed know this, but some of them say that this relation is not necessary and indissoluble. According to them it is a fortuitous relation. Subject and object are

brought together, they say, in the act of knowing ; but out of knowledge, when the act of knowing is over, the relation ceases. But such a theory implies a source of belief other than knowledge, something excluded by our author's theory of knowledge. Knowledge reveals only a subject in relation to an object and an object in relation to a subject ; it tells us nothing of an unrelated subject or object, if indeed such things could have any meaning at all. But there seems to be a mode of escape from this difficulty, and that is to assert that knowledge itself reveals something in the nature of the subject and the object, or in their relation, which can exist independently of knowledge,—independently of the relation of subject and object. But does not this involve a contradiction ? Knowledge, which is a relation, is said to testify to something beyond relation. Knowledge is affirmed as making known the unknown and unknowable. All realistic theories,—theories asserting the existence of things independent of the relation of knowledge,—involve such contradictions. But we shall waive this point at present and taking for granted that knowledge can reveal something existing out of knowledge, proceed to an interrogation of knowledge,—an analysis of its contents, and see what verdict it gives as to the relative claims of Idealism and Realism. Such an analysis Pandit Tattvabhúshan has given in several parts of his works. He gives it in great detail in the first three chapters of his *Brahmajijnásá* (Bengali and English) and in briefer though somewhat maturer forms in his *Philosophy of Bráhmaism, Theism of the Upanishads, Evidences of*

Theism and the Introduction to his Sanskrit and Bengali edition of the Chhāndogya Upanishad. In these analyses there is presented a doctrine of relativity in which there are four principal points,—(1) The relation of sense to understanding, (2) The relation of space to the Spaceless or Infinite, (3) The relation of time to the Timeless or Eternal, and (4) The relation of the individual or relative self to the Universal or Absolute. Coming to the first point, we find that unreflective common sense takes colour, taste, smell, sound and touch as qualities of unconscious extramental objects existing just as they are presented to our minds. It does not see the contradiction involved in the belief or that the fact of presentation to knowledge makes any difference to these objects or their qualities. Philosophers, at any rate modern philosophers, know this at least partly and some of them recognise the truth that what they call the secondary qualities of matter, namely colour, touch, taste, smell and sound, are meaningless without reference to sense or feeling. Even a little reflection is enough to show that an unseen colour, an unfelt heat or cold, an untasted sweetness or bitterness, a smell that is not felt or a sound that is not heard is not conceivable. These therefore are called sensations or sensuous feelings. But this description of them does not fully bring out their relativity, their necessary relation to something distinct from them,—something not sensuous. Sensations or feelings are apt to be thought of and are actually thought of by certain philosophers as things existing by themselves, as capable of being combined

by the laws of association into more or less permanent things and of being dissolved and destroyed without leaving any trace of them. The unreasonableness of this mode of thinking is obvious from the consideration that 'sensations' and 'feelings' are mere abstractions and not concrete realities. The whole and concrete reality in a sensation or feeling is 'I sense', 'I feel'. A sensation or feeling has no meaning or reality without relation to the 'I' that senses or feels. And the 'I' that senses or feels is something more than a sensation or a feeling. Sensations are many and various, while the 'I' is one and indivisible, bringing unity in the 'manifold of sense'. Sensations come and go, but the 'I' is permanent and retains a knowledge of sensations even when they as events pass away. The 'I' or ego thus occupies a higher stage of existence than sensation : it lives in a region of ideas or conceptions which, though requiring sensations or feelings as their 'matter', are higher than they as universal 'forms'. However, is anything else than the ego and its sensations implied in or testified to by the act of perception ? Realistic philosophers say 'yes'. They assert this specially with reference to the tactful sensation of resistance and generally to the other sensations also, all of which are sought to be shown as modifications of touch. According to them the tactful sensations reveal a resisting substance or power occupying space,—something which is the cause of all our sensations. Externality and resistance are thus said to be the primary qualities of this philosophical 'matter', something very different from what unphiloso-

phical people mean by the term. Now, Pandit Tattvabúshan has tried to show in his works already named and in the lecture on the Sankhya philosophy in his *Krishna and the Gítá* that the idea of such an extramental substance or power arises, in the case of both the Sankhya philosophy and the Dualistic systems of the west, from regarding the self as a mere passive recipient of sensations. Far from the self being such a passive inactive reality, the very idea of power or activity is really derived from our own conscious and voluntary activity. But as the self seems to get sensations without any voluntary activity, the power of producing sensations is transferred to a not-self from which knowledge and will are both abstracted. But as we have already seen, mere 'sensations' or 'feelings' are abstractions, the concrete reality being 'I feel',—a self in the act or condition of feeling. It is absurd therefore to seek a cause, an explanation, of mere sensations. What should explain sensations must explain the self also of which sensation is a mode or condition. And this no extramental and unconscious reality,—supposing such a reality were at all conceivable,—can do. In fact the self requires no explanation at all, as we shall see by and by. It is a timeless reality and the logical prius of all existence. It has indeed a finite and an infinite moment in it and the infinite may in a sense be said to be the cause or explanation of the finite. If the rise and fall, the appearance and disappearance, of feeling in the finite self requires any explanation, it must be sought in the activity of the Infinite, and this activity must be conceived as con-

scious and voluntary,—similar to that in the finite self, from which the very idea of activity is derived. The supposition of an unconscious substance or power external to mind but communicating elements of consciousness to it is a useless and self-contradictory supposition, however strong a hold it may have had on a certain class of thinkers. Pandit Tattvabhúshan showed all this very clearly, somewhat in the fashion of Bishop Berkeley, in his early tract, *The Roots of Faith*, and has done so in the more precise form of Hegel and the English Neo-Hegelians in his later works, specially in the appendix to his *Philosophy of Bráhmaism* and his Introduction to the *Chhándogya*.

Coming to our second point, we should note that Absolute Idealism, as it finds expression and exposition in Pandit Tattvabhúshan's works and in those of the Western writers whom he follows more or less, has not only nothing to say against the idea of an external world, that is a world in space, but actually regards such a world as a necessary correlate of God, the Infinite Spirit. What it is concerned to show is that such a world cannot be independent of spirit. Our author shows in several parts of his works, specially in the second chapter of his *Brahmajijnásá*, that the very conception of things as external to one another, for instance the parts of the book before us, implies a spirit to which all are present, which is not external to any of them, and to which space or externality cannot be attributed as a quality or attribute. Externality is a relation implying both distinction and

unity. We think of spaces as distinct from one another and yet connected as parts of one space. It is the presence of a spaceless Reality, a Reality which is spaceless and yet relates space to it, that makes this relation possible. And it is our unity with this Reality that makes it possible for us to know space and know the Reality itself. As connecting the many, the all, it is necessarily one and we necessarily conceive it as one. Space is not really infinite. The very idea of externality implies the exclusion of one from the other, and this is limitation. We indeed think of space as addible without limitation, but this gives the idea of the indefinite rather than the infinite. The only real Infinite is thought or consciousness, which makes the externality of one thing to another possible, but which itself, being not external to anything, includes everything.

Thirdly, we reach the Eternal by a process similar to the above. Events follow one another. This is time. To unreflecting people, and to reflection of a certain stage, events and their order seem to be self-explaining and not to need anything else to explain them. But we have seen that sensations are related to the non-sensuous, and actions to an agent. In the same way events and their order imply something which is not an event and an order. A series of passing sensations or actions which we may call *a*, *b*, *c*, for instance the reading of these words and sentences, would be impossible without a knowing and active self, which we may name KA. The first event *a* is really KAa. When *a* is over as an event, its knowledge remains as KAa and connecting

itself with *b* becomes KAab, or else *b* would not be known as *b*, the *second* event of the series. In the same manner, when *b* is over as an event, its knowledge is retained as KAab, or else *c* would not be known as *c*, the third of the series. Time therefore is impossible without the Timeless or Eternal and our knowledge of time would be impossible if the Eternal were not in us as our very self. All this is shown in great detail in the second chapter of our author's *Brahmajijnásá* and briefly in almost all his works.

We now come to our fourth and last point, the relation of the finite self to the Infinite. We have already seen that what we call our own self, in relation to which all things in space and time are known, is itself spaceless and timeless. It is space and time that constitute finitude, and we have already seen that the finite cannot be known except in necessary relation to the Infinite, the Eternal. We have thus the Infinite and Eternal in us as our very self. In knowing the world as a necessarily connected whole, as one world, inspite of its variety and manifoldness, we know the *Ekamevádvít̄syam*, the One only without a second,—know him not by any mediate process but by direct vision. But our imperfections as beings of limited knowledge, power, love and holiness seem to blur this vision and invalidate this knowledge. This objection however arises from not taking a proper cognisance of the fact that the Infinite and Eternal Self communicates knowledge and other excellences to us,—constitutes our finite selfhood,—through a finite medium,—an organism gross or subtle. *How he does so, may be*

inscrutable to us, but *that* he does so is obvious and a matter of constant experience. We know the sensuous world, the world which we ignorantly call material, but which is really spiritual through and through. And we necessarily think of it as one and all-comprehensive. But our acts of perception are determined by space and time. The world, though a totality, is perceived by us part by part and one part after another. Though one, it is reflected, reproduced or manifested, in many centres. These centres are thus constituted different selves or persons seemingly independent but really dependent on the original Self and so unified with one another. All this proves that the Infinite Self has a finite moment or aspect in its nature. In fact as the finite is inconceivable without the Infinite, so is the Infinite inconceivable without the finite. It is this dual nature of the Absolute, with his moments of finiteness and infinitude, that makes possible and explains, at least partially, the fact of his manifestation in our lives as human selves with their limitations and at the same time as the Divine Support of these human selves with his infinitude unimpaired. The familiar facts of our daily life, the full significance of which we miss because of their familiarity, show clearly, on reflection, this dual nature of God,—the unity-in-difference of the Father and the Son and their eternal colloquy. In each act of knowing, even in the simplest act of what we call sensuous perception, we, as sons, pass from ignorance to knowledge. But we know that the knowledge we thus acquire, with both its subjective and objective

sides, the knowing and the known, was in the Father before it was communicated to us. Common sense and Realism admit this fact in the form that the object exists before it is known. But we have seen that the object can exist only in knowledge. In every act of knowing therefore the Father communicates himself,—a part of his infinite and eternal knowledge,—to the son. In our oblivion,—our acts of forgetting,—it is the son that forgets, and not the Father. If the Father himself forgot, so that the thing forgotten were wholly lost, there would be no remembrance. In the same manner, when we sleep and lose all our conscious life as finite beings, the Infinite in us remains awake all the time and, through our organisms refreshed and recreated by rest, gives back our respective experiences stored up in him with all their distinctions and limitations intact. The same play of Perfect and imperfect, Father and son, takes place more impressively in our ethical and spiritual life, which is to be treated in another chapter. It is the finite that is tempted and sins : the Infinite is 'suddham apáviddham,' holy, impeccable.

It will thus be seen that the system sketched above and expounded in detail in our author's works is a system of Theism and not one of Monism or Pantheism. In it neither the physical world, the world of sense, nor the finite self is merged in God. Their existence as realities distinct from God is clearly acknowledged, but they are shown as dependent on him. God is treated as both immanent in them and as transcending their limitations. '*Tad antarasya sarvasya tadu sarvasyásya báhyatah.*—'He is in all this and also out of all this.'—(*Isopanishad*, 5.)

CHAPTER III

Proofs of the Existence of God

Pandit Tattvabhushan has stated all the current proofs of the existence of God in several of his works. In three of these he has given them more fully than in others, namely in his *Brahmajijnasá*, *Philosophy of Brahmanism*, and *Evidences of Theism*. We shall follow the last book in our brief statement of these proofs. They are four in number, (1) the Causal or Cosmological, (2) the Teleological, (3) the Ontological, and (4) the Moral. The (2) may be said to be a form of the (1), and the (4) a form of the (3). "The fourfold nature of the proof," says our author, "is due to the four stages which human thought gradually traverses. The first and the lowest stage may be called the physical. In this the human mind is almost exclusively occupied with matter,—with the change and motion of unconscious objects." "The second stage of human thought," continues our author. "may be called the biological. In it life is recognised as a phenomenon distinct from mere matter, for it manifests, besides other characteristics, the relation of end and means between its parts or members.....The third stage of thought may be called the psychological or metaphysical, as it contemplates the world as an object of knowledge, as related to mind," which, it is shown, is *ontos* or the ultimate reality. "The fourth or final stage of thought is the ethical, in which the world and

human life are discovered as regulated by moral laws and as tending to serve an ultimate good, and thus ascribed to a morally perfect Being”

The first proof shows that the world is a *cosmos*, an ordered world, and traces it to a conscious Cause, a Supreme Mind. “The world would not be a world”, says our author, “if it were not ordered, with objects manifesting fixed characteristics. And objects would not be objects unless they uniformly did the things ascribed to them. The sun uniformly gives light and heat. The earth revolves and goes round the sun, thereby causing day and night and the regular alternation of seasons. It supports other objects upon it and gives forth grain and other products. Fire burns and gives light. Air and water show fixed characters and produce uniform effects on vegetable and animal organisms. Thus these objects are so many centres of uniform activity and are identified and named by us only by such activity. But it is only the changes or effects produced by them which appear before our perceptive knowledge. We see light, we feel heat, we hear sound, we have experience of smells, tastes and touches ; but the activity, force or power which brings about these changes is not perceived but only conceived, thought of, by us. Unreflective persons do not see this difference. They think that the agency or causality behind the changes observed by them,—that which constitutes the very objectivity of objects, makes them what they are,—is as much an object of observation as the changes themselves. But it is not so. If we had not another source of knowledge, a source

distinct yet not separable from perception, we could have no idea of activity, force or power,—of causality in the real sense. One change may be uniformly followed by another, for instance, day by night, but we do not for that reason call the former a cause and the latter an effect. We may sometimes describe such an invariable antecedent as a cause, but we are not finally satisfied by assigning a change to another change. For instance, we may say that a piece of paper was burnt because it fell into an oven. In this case we ascribe one change, that is burning, to another change, which is falling. But we know that mere falling is not the real cause. The real cause is the *power* of burning which we ascribe to fire. Our causal inquiry is not satisfied by assigning one change to another, however invariable may be the relation of the one to the other. It demands as the cause of a change something which is itself not a change, but a permanent reality having the power of acting,—the power of producing changes while remaining identical with itself. Such a reality we know only by introspection,—looking into ourselves, into our own inner nature. We indeed know ourselves in knowing the changes appearing before our senses; but we do not always look closely or deeply into ourselves or reflect on our true nature as knowing, feeling and willing beings. When we do so reflect, we find that we are the producers, the originators, the creators, so to say, of our actions. We see that we may change our own minds and, through the help of our bodies, change the objects around us to some extent. For instance, we may recall

to our mind a tree which we have seen, and imagine it to be broken or cut into pieces. We may place a note-book before us and put down our thoughts in it in the form of sentences. Man must have marked the originating power in himself from the earliest dawn of intelligence in him ; for it is only because he is aware of such a power in him that there is for him a world of fixed objects with powers to produce uniform series of changes. It is because he is an agent himself that he thinks of the sun and the moon, of fire, air and water, of the earth and various objects on it, as so many agents. In thinking so he unavoidably personifies them ; for agency or activity in him is necessarily connected with knowledge and intention. He cannot act without knowing and willing what he does. Changes in him not consciously and intentionally produced by him he ascribes to agents other than he. And of power or agency other than conscious and intentional he has not the slightest idea. Hence we find in the earliest religious literature of the world, the *Rigveda*, all the prominent objects of the world, the sun and the moon, fire and lightning, the earth, air and water, etc., spoken of and addressed as deities. Gradually, when the distinct individuality of these objects became doubtful and uncertain, and their *unity* began to appear, for instance, when the identity of heat, whether in or beside the earth, was seen, and the connection of the sun, air and water in producing clouds was observed, the Vedic Rishis began to say, '*Ekam sat biprā bahudā vadanti*',—'The wise call the same Being by various names.' In the *Upanishads*,

the last form of Vedic literature, this Monotheism or Monism was distinctly and systematically formulated. In them all objects,—both persons and what are called material objects,—are only parts or aspects of the same reality, the Absolute Mind or God. But all men are not deep or consistent thinkers like the Vedic seers. Though we derive the very idea of activity from the exercise of our wills, so that unconscious and unintentional action is really unmeaning, people marked that the behaviour of what we call material objects is very different from that of men and the lower animals. They do not respond to our thoughts, feelings and actions, as the latter do, and yet they act. Hence, activity came to be thought of as an abstract quality not necessarily related to thought and intention, and the material world was gradually denuded of mind. The existence even of the Supreme Mind, *Isvara* or *Brahman*, became doubtful, and the idea of a blind force behind the phenomena of nature became credible in some quarters. In this respect the scientific mind has fared scarcely better than the popular mind. In fact the former deals more largely in abstractions than the latter. While ordinary unreflective people think of 'objects,' which have neither knowledge, feeling nor will, and yet have the power of acting,—acting uniformly according to fixed laws,—scientific men, specially those whose labours are confined to physical science, speak of mere 'forces' as acting under such laws. Those of them who know that the idea of force or power is derived from our voluntary activity, and that mere force without thought and will is an abstraction, deny

its existence altogether and leave it out in their attempted explanations of the world. Of the nature and value of such explanations we shall have some idea by and by. Meanwhile we must see that the very idea of the world as an assemblage of objects having fixed characters, that is, doing certain actions under uniform, unalterable laws,—an idea which lies at the basis of our daily and momentary life,—implies the existence of an all-knowing and all-powerful Person to whose activity all natural phenomena are due. All objects are agents ; and agency or activity is dependent on knowledge and intention. We must therefore either personify all objects,—think of them as conscious individuals,—or if we see reason to deny individuality to them, we must transfer the activity ignorantly ascribed to them to a real centre of consciousness. If the sun and the earth, if fire, air and water are not conscious individuals, and therefore not powers or agents in the real sense, the actions ascribed to them must be those of a Supreme Person immanent in them. And even the power we call our own, since it is not original, but derived, must also be ultimately ascribed to him.....True insight into the meaning of 'order', 'law' and 'causality', even of the most familiar of all ideas, that of 'object' or 'thing', reveals to us the presence of God everywhere. There is incessant activity without and within us,—activity not our own and not belonging to any finite and embodied being we know of. Not to speak of activity in external nature and in our own bodies, even the appearance of ideas and feelings in our minds and their disappearance from

them are not due to our own wills. We must therefore ascribe them to the Divine Will."

Now, "if all action is ultimately intentional, and unintentional action an inconceivable thing, as we have tried to show, there is hardly any need to cite particular instances of design,—phenomena related as ends and means,—in order to prove the intelligence of the Creative Power. In that case such instances serve only to confirm and illustrate the Cosmological Proof. But if the fundamental principle of this proof is questioned, unconscious and mechanical action being regarded as possible, and the fixed order of nature is supposed not to call for intention, then it may be shewn by a distinct line of reasoning that the phenomena of life, if not those of inorganic nature, do call for purpose or design behind them. The changes and motions of material objects are comparatively simple phenomena, and when considered apart from life and their usefulness to vegetable and animal organisms, they present an appearance of mechanism to certain classes of persons, specially those who are almost exclusively occupied with lifeless objects. But life is a thing very different from inorganic matter. We think of matter as extended in space. The parts of a material object are external to one another and may exist separately, their connection being contingent and not necessary. We think of one material object acting on another from without, or the parts of one object acting upon one another in the same way, for example, the upper part of a table acting upon the lower and the lower reacting upon the upper. We think of different simple

things combining and making a composite thing, which, though sometimes presenting new qualities, is quantitatively nothing but an aggregate of its components. Oxygen and hydrogen combine in certain proportions and make water, which, though showing different qualities not found in or predictable from its components, is yet thought of as nothing but a composition. But in life everything is different. In an animal organism, so far as it is a material object, there are indeed parts external to one another, but its life is a *unity*, an integral *whole*. When a part is cut off from the whole, the former ceases to be living and the latter is injured. When vital parts are cut off, the whole organism dies. In certain lower organisms the separated parts live, but complete themselves by growing the parts lost, thus showing the unity of life in another way. Material objects grow by accretion,—the external addition of one part to another; for instance, a river from the gradual addition of water from a spring or from other rivers. But an organism, whether vegetable or animal, grows by *assimilation*,—by attracting foreign matter and turning it into its own tissue. While the connection of the parts of a material whole is contingent, as we have already seen, the parts of an organism are necessary, which we have also partly seen. Not only are the parts injured by losing one another, but there is close correspondence and co-ordination among them. The brain guides the whole organism by using the five senses. The hands and feet move about and bring supplies. The stomach, through the help of the liver, reduces food to blood, and the heart circulates

it throughout the body. The excretive organs push all superfluous and harmful matter out of the organism ; and the organ of generation, the most wonderful of all organs, reproduces and perpetuates the kind. The phenomena are inexplicable without teleology,—the conception of purpose or design. In the very constitution of a vegetable seed and an animal germ there is something which is not material, something inexplicable by mere mechanism. The growth of a tree from a vegetable seed and that of an animal from an animal germ is unpredictable from its mere composition as a material object and the laws which regulate the growth of such objects. Life is something super-added to mere matter. And then there is selection in the process of growth. A tamarind seed grows into a tamarind tree, and a mango tree into a mango tree, but not the reverse. Each takes in from the soil just what it needs for its growth and rejects what it does not need. In the growth of material objects, the cause,—that is, the components forming a material whole by their gradual addition,—determines the effect : the present determines the future. But in the growth of an organism it is the effect, the future,—the complete tree or animal *yet to be*—which determines the cause, the materials at work. It is the future which guides and regulates the present. This is possible only when the effect, the future, what has yet to be, is already potentially present, that is, present in idea and thought, in the mind of a creative agent. This is what people really think when they predict the growth of a tree or an animal from a seed or a germ, or the deve-

lopment of a child into a full-grown man ; but all have not the capacity to look closely into their minds and discover what lies there. However, the idea of design or purpose in the nature and growth of organisms becomes even more clear when we contemplate their wonderful complexity,—a complexity which is, as it were, rounded off by unity. The limbs and organs of a body and the work they do cannot even be thought and spoken of without the idea of design. They are not what they are without reference to the ends they serve. The eyes and ears are eyes and ears because they serve the purposes of seeing and hearing. Their structure and mechanism are all calculated to serve these ends. Without reference to these ends they would be mere unmeaning lumps of matter. But we know they are not such lumps. Whatever people may say when they pose as atheists, they habitually and in all concerns of practical life think of eyes as *meant* for seeing and ears for hearing, and so of the whole body as *intended* for the various ends served by it. Biology or the science of life must in the same manner be guided by the conception of design if it grasps in their fulness the phenomena of organic growth, conservation and reproduction. But when design is seen in life, and what is called dead matter is seen in its relation to life, the appearance of mere mechanism in the former vanishes, and it is found to be equally guided by knowledge and intention. Air, without reference to its relation to life, may seem to be a mere chemical combination without purpose, but when we consider that it sustains life, and

that there is a wonderful connection between it and our lungs, so that the latter, by their very nature and structure, draw and absorb the former, it ceases to be a mere mechanical product. That which sustains life cannot be quite dead, but must have the elements of life in it. The same is true of water and the various kinds of food used by us. As life-sustaining substances they must have life latent in them. And this applies to the whole world which we call material. The sun and the moon, even the stars, though so far from us, are more or less connected with life and produce effects on it. The mechanical view of the world, the view that it is governed by blind laws, is therefore only a tentative view which is disproved when we rise to a higher point of view. It may be remarked in passing that according to the discoveries of our great Indian scientist, Dr. J. C. Bose, even what is called inorganic matter gives responses to electric stimuli,—responses which our unaided senses cannot catch and even ordinary scientific instruments fail to record, but which the wonderfully fine instruments invented by him are sensible to. All this proves that the line we draw between dead and living matter is more or less arbitrary. It may be useful for the ordinary purposes of life, but it is not based on a true insight into the nature of things. The whole world is an organism, life pulsating in every part of it. Life is everywhere, but it is not equally *manifest* in all objects and not manifest at all in some. However, we should not confound its non-manifestation with its non-existence. This will become clearer when we rise to the third

stage of thought and contemplate the world as related to mind."

The Ontological Proof has been given at some length in our second chapter and we therefore omit it here. When it is understood, it is seen that the universe is a manifestation of God,—a graded order of manifestation rising to human life as the highest form of the manifested divine life. Our conscious life, it is seen, is a constant colloquy between the finite and the Infinite, and the end of life and creation is the spiritual union of the former with the latter. But this is seen only when the reality and value of the ethical and spiritual life and the moral perfection of the divine character is realised. We shall therefore close this chapter by briefly stating what Pandit Tattvabhushan says on the point. Our extract is from *The Evidences of Theism*. A more detailed treatment of the subject will be found in the *Philosophy of Bráhmaism* and in *Brahmasádhan*. "At what stage of his development man's ethicality emerges from his animality, cannot be clearly traced any more than the emergence of life from what we call dead matter, or sentiency from life, or consciousness from sentiency. It is only when a higher form of existence is somewhat developed and clearly distinguished from the next lower that we can observe it and enumerate its peculiar characteristics. The animal acts from instinct and appetite. It is hungry and instinctively seeks food. It is thirsty and drinks water in the same manner. Its experience of pleasure and pain blindly leads it to seek the former and avoid the latter. Its sexual appetite draws it

towards the opposite sex, its filial instinct makes it take care of its young and its instinct of self-preservation impels it to hate and oppose its enemies. How far, if at all, the objects of these instincts and appetites rise before the mind of the lower animal as ends, as forms of *good* to be steadily pursued in spite of opposing inclinations and circumstances, cannot be said. But it is in this,—in the pursuit of an end conceived as *good*,—that ethicality consists. Actions directed to good ends are *right*, and opposite actions, even omissions of right actions, are *wrong*. It would not be surprising if the rudiments of ethicality or morality were found in some animals inferior to man ; but it is in man alone that it is unmistakably found and has a growth to which no end can be assigned. In him even instinctive actions become gradually *moral*, and forms of good of which inferior animals have no idea reveal themselves to his mind's eye and call forth new lines of activity. Eating and drinking, which are merely instinctive to the animal and to man also so far as he is an animal, ultimately become duties to him when the preservation, health and nourishment of the body are seen to be ends, *good ends*, and he *has to* eat and drink sometimes even against his immediate inclinations. In the same manner the sexual appetite, love and hate, the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, all ultimately come under the moral law,—the law of right and wrong, of good and evil. As man's consciousness, his rational nature, grows quantitatively and qualitatively, his moral nature also proportionately grows in the same manner. From the very beginning of his

conscious life he sees that he is not alone, but is related to others of his kind. His personal life is connected with his domestic life and the latter with the life of his clan or tribe. By and by he sees that he belongs to a race or nation, and finally to humanity, a brotherhood of nations. He sees therefore that he has duties not only to himself, but also to his family, tribe, nation and man as man. On the other hand he sees that his nature is a complex one and his duties also, both personal and social, are correspondingly complex. He is not only an eating and drinking being, but a thinking, loving and admiring being. He values knowledge or truth not only for its uses, but for its own sake, as itself. He loves fellow-men, his relatives and others, not merely because they contribute to his own pleasure, but because they are lovable in themselves. In the same manner he admires beauty and stands awe-struck before sublimity for their own sakes. His *good* therefore, both personal and social, branches itself into physical, intellectual and aesthetic, and issues into duties corresponding to these various aspects of his nature. The objects of man's higher pursuit are briefly said to be the true, the good, and the beautiful, the second relating specially to man's duties to others. But seen deeply, the true and the beautiful are also comprehended in the good. Even the pleasant, which is often conceived as opposed to the good, is a part of the latter when it does not conflict with other forms of it. Pleasure, both for ourselves and our fellow-beings, is a real good, though not the only good, and attempts to promote it

consistently with the pursuit of other ends are not only allowable, but a real duty. However, from a comprehensive view of our own nature, such as we have indicated above, there arises in our minds the ideal of a perfect character, an ideal which, in so far as we conceive it with more or less clearness, demands our loyal allegiance. It prescribes for us rules as to how we should think, feel, speak and act in the various walks of life, approves our conduct when we follow those rules and censures us when we disregard them. This is what we call conscience. Under what circumstances and by what stages conscience is developed, in other words, the moral law or ideal is revealed to us, is irrelevant to our subject. The growth of practical and ethical knowledge follows broadly the same laws as those of theoretic or scientific knowledge. Both grow through errors or aberrations incidental to the nature of finite beings. But as knowledge is knowledge and science is science inspite of the history of their growth, so is conscience conscience inspite of the process through which it has grown to be what it is. As the former shows what our life and its environments *are*, so the latter tells us what they *ought to be*. As the one reveals the *wisdom* of God, so the other reveals his *will*. While we have to *conform* to the former, we are called upon to *carry out* the latter. From our exposition of the Ontological Proof it must have been seen that in every act of knowledge,—the knowledge of what we call nature,—it is God himself who is present with us. The same will be found to be true when the Moral Proof is comprehended. Knowledge, of whatever kind, is the

result of divine inspiration. The knowledge of right and wrong has this peculiarity that it reveals the character of God, which mere theoretical knowledge does not. In appealing to our will, the Moral Law reveals the will of God. And will is character. The perfection which the Moral Law demands from us must exist in a realised form in God. The Father is perfect and wants his son to strive after perfection with all his might. Even in our failings we see that the Law is absolute and the Law-giver perfect. Because we are unloving, the law of love loses nothing of its absolutely imperative character and all the same testifies to the perfect love of God. Because we are ugly, the beauty of holiness loses none of its lustre and nevertheless reveals the perfect beauty of God. There are moments when our wills are fully attuned to the divine will, when we embrace the whole world and harbour no unholy feeling or desire in our hearts. We are then at one with God. This unity of Father and son is the clearest revelation of the divine character. Herein we see, in the most direct manner, the perfect love and holiness of God. No observation of nature, however minute, no contemplation of cosmic evils, be it ever so bitter, can shake our faith in the divine goodness if it is based on this direct vision.....If man, with all his limitations, and all opposing circumstances, can be perfect, if only for a time, God in his infinitude, with no other power opposing his will, must be ever-perfect. To conceive him otherwise is to think of the cause as less than the effect, of the part as greater than the whole, which is absurd. Men who,

from the standpoint of the ideal of perfection revealed to them, impugn the divine character and deny or doubt God's love or justice, really contradict themselves. They set themselves up as better than their Maker, forgetting for the time wherefrom their superior wisdom and goodness come."

The presence of various forms of evil in the world, which seems inconsistent with the moral perfection of God, is dealt with at some length in the pamphlet we have quoted from and will be briefly dealt with in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

The Problem of Evil and the Goodness of God

Pandit Tattvabhushan contends that our wrong or imperfect idea of what is our true good stands in the way of our true vision of the divine goodness, especially of God's love for man. When happiness is wrongly regarded as the highest good and the promotion of happiness supposed to be the end of love or goodness, it is no wonder that we should consider God as more or less indifferent to our well-being, as we not unoften find ourselves deprived of the happiness to which we wrongly set our hearts as our due. And we consciously or unconsciously reason that a good God would not deprive us of our dues. But in reality the true good consists in self-realisation, of which happiness, in our mundane existence, forms only an insignificant part. God's goodness lies in the perfection of his intellectual, emotional and æsthetic nature and his love to man consists in his constant care to promote the latter's true self-realisation. The path of self-development lies through a great deal of suffering and struggle, and the pleasant and the painful alike help the growth of our souls. So our thankfulness to God should not be measured by the sweet and pleasant things we enjoy, but by the amount of self-realisation the soul attains. If we fix our eyes on this point "we may be saved from many a difficulty that we experience in the varied trials of life in keeping our faith unshaken in the perfect love of God for man." (*The Philosophy of Brahmanism* p. 201)

Another difficulty lies in our wrong conception of the laws of nature, which are supposed to take into consideration not every individual human being, but only the human race as a whole. That is never the case. It may be that the Divine Ruler acts according to general principles, but like a tender mother he deals with every one of us individually. He is the ear of the ear, the eye of the eye, the life of life of each of us, as the *Upanishads* say, so there is no reason to suppose that the effects produced by nature on every individual are not intentional and purposive on the part of God. He directly deals with individuals through general laws. Yet it must be noticed that owing to our imperfect and indirect knowledge of nature, without the light afforded by conscience, the moral nature of God cannot be revealed to us, as the Pandit observes in his *Religion of Brahman*. After relating how it is not possible for natural phenomena to give us direct testimony as to the inner character of God he reasons why the apparent evils in nature should not trouble us much. "In all attempts to reconcile the goodness of God with the existence of evil in the world it must be constantly borne in mind that our faith in the divine goodness is not an inference from the benevolent order of the world—from the provision of happiness and moral progress of created beings that we see in nature. A sound induction from these facts does indeed lead to the conclusion that there is a large preponderance of good over evil in the world, and that the author of nature is a beneficent

Being. But it does not prove that this goodness is perfect. Our faith in the divine perfection rests, as we have seen, on higher and surer grounds, namely, the deliverances of conscience. Though we are liable to occasional mistakes in our judgment of what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is evil, conscience invariably and infallibly tells us to choose the right and the good and eschew the wrong and the evil, and thus shows that he whose will and character it reveals is perfectly and invariably good. This unequivocal verdict of our higher nature, when heard in all its strength and fullness, gives us a faith which cannot be shaken by any number of merely physical and sensuous events.....To learn the meaning of right and wrong, good and evil, from conscience, and then, from the tendency of some natural events to promote our good to conclude that so far as these events go the Author of nature is a good Being, and from the seemingly evil tendency of certain other events to declare that these qualify and limit his goodness, is not a valid procedure. If the verdict of conscience be accepted at all, it must be accepted in its entirety. If the distinction of right and wrong, good and evil, be regarded as a valid distinction—a distinction in the real nature of things,—the faith to which this distinction bears witness—the conception of a perfect Being—of which our moral judgments are but abstract expressions, must be regarded as objectively valid, as the revelation of a real perfection. When faith in the divine perfection is thus based on its real foundation, the various forms of apparent

evil in the world fail to shake it. Whether we are able or not to reconcile them with the divine goodness by any process of reasoning, we believe that they are reconcilable with it. We feel that it is the necessary limitations of our understandings, consequent on our being created beings, that prevent us from seeing the harmony of these events with the perfect goodness of God, and that to him who sees all—sees what is nearest to us as well as what is farthest, the most remote past and future as well as the present—all things must be in perfect accord with one another."

Now Pandit Tattvabhushan in his *Philosophy of Brahmanism* refers to certain impossibilities both in the moral world as well as in the physical, such as two and two cannot make five or a created being cannot be made perfect. He also refers to certain painful events that ultimately make for good, thereby proving the relative character of what are generally taken to be evils. These points have been more elaborately dealt with in *Brahmajijnásá*, from which we quote below. For a fuller discussion of the subject he refers the reader to Dr. Martineau's *Study of Religion* Bk. II, Chap. III. and to Hedge's *Reason in Religion* : "The Old Enigma." Then the Pandit observes : "The first remark that we have to make is that for establishing our faith on a firm ground a discussion of such events is not absolutely necessary. The real foundation of faith is internal evidence. Where the intellect fails to understand, the soul rests on the bright light of reason within and hopes that with the progress of knowledge the unintelligible will become

intelligible". (p. 189) We make this concession to a trusted human friend when his doings seem enigmatical and seemingly wrong, believing that in time we shall see the reasonableness of such actions. If this is our attitude towards an imperfect human friend, why should we not show that charity to our greatest friend, the Supreme Being ? How can we expect to penetrate into the meaning of all the acts of the Infinite with the particle of knowledge vouchsafed to us ?

"Our second remark on the subject is that the explanation which some sceptics offer of the enigma is quite unacceptable. They think that the evils of the world are due to the fact that God has not been able to bring entirely under his control the original uncreated matter which forms the substance of the world". (p. 190) There is no meaning in this explanation, because what is called matter is dependent on God for its existence ; efficiency belongs to consciousness, and the only power that exists in the universe is the infinite and indivisible Mind ; so an unconscious object opposing God is absolutely meaningless.

"Our third remark is that many events in nature which seem to be evils are only blessings in disguise. With the progress of human knowledge many things and events that formerly seemed to be harmful have been proved to be beneficial." (p. 191) Not only are apparently unkind cosmic events for our good, but the troubles and trials of life have useful purposes to serve. "It is to be hoped that with the gradual advancement of human knowledge the real nature of many other things now seeming to be evil will be revealed." (p. 191)

"The fourth remark is that the process of creation is still going on and it has not yet reached perfection. To this subject the Pandit reverts in his *Theism of the Upanishads* and *Evidences of Theism* and shows that evil both metaphysical and moral is necessary and therefore cannot be incompatible with the divine goodness. A world created in time can never be perfect, it can only be progressively better and better. The divine purpose in regard to the world is not yet fully revealed, but is being gradually revealed. It is unavoidable that in the course of this gradual development of the world many imperfections should be seen in it. The Creator cannot be blamed for this imperfection, for it is continually vanishing. To the question, "Why this gradual development? Why did not God make the world perfect from the beginning?" only the following answer can be given from what little we understand of the matter: "(1) The only idea we have of a thing subject to time is that it should grow gradually. Time implies a process, in this case a process of growth. (2) Even if it were possible for the universe to come out perfect from the Creator's hand, it would not be desirable. In that case man would understand nothing of its nature. Science depends on the study of process. (3) Not only science, but other characteristics of humanity would perhaps have been impossible in that case. It is because the world is a process of growth that man is active." (*Brahmajijnasa* p. 193) Man has to struggle in order to remove his wants and in this struggle he is constantly coming into relations of sympathy, co-

operation and competition with fellowmen. But for this imperfection his manhood would have been impossible.

Fifthly, "a created object must necessarily be finite and imperfect. Something which begins to be must be such that it can make continual progress, but can never be perfect. Imperfection must be inherent in it, and this inherent imperfection unavoidable....The ultimate explanation of evil is this imperfection inherent in created nature. In seeking an explanation of many particular painful events we see behind them this inherent imperfection of man—his want of knowledge, power etc." (*Ibid pp. 194-196*) This imperfection remains for ever because it is the characteristic of a created being, as God's infinitude and perfection, power and holiness cannot be communicated to any other being.

So the Pandit concludes : "There is really no conflict between the omnipotence and the perfect love and holiness of God on the one hand and the imperfection of created beings and the pain consequent upon it on the other. Notwithstanding the omnipotence and perfect goodness of God, the imperfection of created beings and a certain amount of pain resulting from it are unavoidable. But this pain is, in most instances, the harbinger of higher happiness and spiritual progress. And pain of all forms is transient. With the progress of man pain is disappearing from the world. Our intuitive faith in God's perfection is therefore untouched by the evil seen in the world. But in spite of this clear witness of knowledge our weak faith is often shaken by the several trials of life. Nothing but deep communion with God in worship and the hearty enjoyment of his love can remedy this weakness of faith." (*Ibid p. 196*)

CHAPTER V

Ethical Life

Pandit Tattvabhushan's views on the basis of morals are set forth in the seventh lecture of his *Philosophy of Brahmaism*, where he combats both the Hedonism of English philosophers like Mill and Spencer and the Legalism of Kant and his followers. He shows that the right, the good, is neither identical with the pleasant, as the former say, or is a mere abstract law without an end or object to be realised, as the latter teach. In substantial agreement with Green, Bradley and other Neo-Hegelians, he shows that all moral action has for its end a gradual realisation of the self. He finds this doctrine to be, in substance, also the reaching of the Vedanta and the *Bhagavadgītā*. In his *Brahmasadhan* he shows that like our theoretic thought, ethical thought also passes through three stages,—thesis, antithesis and synthesis. "In all stages of human progress", he says, "the good is always that which satisfies desire. But desire changes its character as man gradually acquires a deeper and truer knowledge of his nature. In the earliest stages, when he exclusively contemplates the physical and sensuous aspect of his nature, the good is naturally identified with food, clothing, houses, conveyances, health, strength, and the various comforts and pleasures of the sensuous life." (pp. 94, 95) But a reaction is bound to set in both in the life of nations and of individuals when things

more valuable than sensuous comforts and pleasures are seen and made objects of pursuit. "These things", as the Pandit points out, "relate to God and the life eternal. As man's vision of these things become clear, a conflict arises between their pursuit and that of things earthly. The one pursuit seems to be opposed to the other and the opposition results in dividing men into two classes,—the materialists and the spiritualists." (p. 96) As this conflict is shown to be both necessary and inevitable, the solution does not lie in giving up one of the opposing forces and siding with the other. Either Hedonism or Monasticism is no solution. Mere pleasure, however refined, cannot be the be-all and end-all of life. Nor does our *summum bonum* lie in the destruction of what is called our lower nature. God is the source of both the animal and spiritual sides of our nature. They both form necessary complements of an undivided whole. Desires, which, in the antithetic stage, are taken to be the enemies of the higher life, precipitate themselves in the final analysis as but servants and auxiliaries of the higher life. Nay more. They are nothing less than elements entering into the very composition of that life. "Thus the tirades," the Pandit continues, "against desire in the utterances of saints and sages are either meaningless or mean only to inculcate its regulation and moderation, the subordination of the lower to the higher, and the conscious inclusion of all in the desire of all desires, that of union with the Infinite. If the lowest ethical life, the least conscious of its real aim

and object, is a life of attachment, *ásakti*, and ethical life in its second stage, the stage of antithesis and conflict, one of detachment or repulsion, *virakti* or *vairágya*, the highest life, the life of synthesis and harmony, is that of *bhakti*, reverential love of God. *Bhakti* is *ásakti* purified by *virakti*, attachment made conscious, by a long course of conflict, of the relative value of things and their proper places in the grand and all-comprehensive scheme of life. It is not the mere love of a supreme person issuing in occasional outbursts of emotional fervour. It is love of everything as in God and of God, the love of food and drink, of seeing and hearing, and other sensuous enjoyments, of wealth and power, of wife and child, of neighbour, country and kind—of everything as the manifestation of God. Such *bhakti*, brightening and adorning all departments of life with its halo, is our aim and object,—an object to be realised not in a distant future here or hereafter, but in everything we do, at every step we take in life's journey.” (pp. 106,107) Then union with the Infinite *i. e.*, the realisation of the Higher Self, is the true end of our ethical life. So, as the Pandit says in Lec. VII of the *Philosophy of Brahmaism*, “in every action we realise a fresh aspect or portion of the universal and infinite life of God. Every action is an act of self-realisation, a realisation of the hidden contents of our soul ; and as the Infinite is our real self, self-realisation is but the realisation of the divine life.” To superficial observers and to men living without reflection the objects pursued seem to be external to the self, but, in reality, objects are sought

because they fill the wants of the self, therefore such pursuit cannot but be a form of self-realisation.

Now, the important question arises wherein lies the difference between moral and immoral life if self-realisation is the end of all our actions. The difference is the difference of the objects pursued. All objects do not contribute equally to the realisation of the self, some even hinder it. There is a great deal in the choice of the self,—the true or the false self,—to be realised. In moral action the agent truly conceives the self and truly realises it, but in immoral action quite reverse is the case. The doctrine of conscience current in the Brahma Samaj, that our consciousness of right or duty is a direct revelation of God's will or nature to us, the direct voice of God in man, is substantially true. When on seeing the distress of my neighbour I am urged by my conscience to run to succour him, the urge is a direct revelation to my will of the Infinite Self rightly conceived as both in me and in my neighbour. But when I am tempted to desist from troubling myself with another man's affair, I allow myself to be led by a wrong conception of the self as only confined to my body. "In every moral struggle", says the Pandit, "in every strife between conscience and temptation, the question that comes for decision is whether we should follow a true or a false self, and the voice of conscience invariably urges us to follow the latter, our true self, which is no other than God, *Paramātmā*, the Perfect One. The realisation of our true self is felt to be an absolute end in itself to which other things stand in the relation of means. It is the one thing

valuable for the sake of which other things have their values." (p. 169)

Yet it is not true that moral laws, as inculcated by some persons, are implanted in us or are revealed to us as truths inherent in our nature. Nor should the rightness or wrongness of an action be conceived as irrespective of the object to which it is directed. Our moral judgments are not absolutely fixed as regards particular actions, but they differ according to the end in view and the means we adopt to realise it. And the end before a moral action is always the realisation of some form of our true self. But the self to be realised may be considered both quantitatively and qualitatively. To begin with quantity, the lowest conception of self is the individualistic, if such a conception is possible for a moral being. At this stage the centre of interests lies in individual life. Now, when the individual identifies himself with the family, treating the good of wife and children as his own good, then ethical life takes a step forward. But man is not merely a domestic animal, a higher and truer self-realisation lies before him when he makes the interests of his tribal and national life his own. Yet he is to overcome the temptations of national life also by merging himself in the life of humanity, recognising the unity of all human beings in a universal brotherhood. "But the due recognition of the unity of mankind" as Tattvabhushan points out, "is always found conjoined with a recognition, in some form or other, of a unity transcending humanity itself,—a cosmic or divine unity, a Universal Father, a Universal Self or a Uni-

versal Law of good, of which humanity itself is a partial manifestation,—which is at once the source, life and truth of human life. When this Unity is recognised, every duty to humanity is seen to be derived from and due to it, and moral life assumes the depth and grandeur which we express by the term *spiritual*."

Qualitatively ethical life advances from sensuous to intellectual, from intellectual to emotional, then to the spiritual state. Mere pleasure-seeking, even when it is altruistic, cannot lead to the true realisation of the self. Man is not merely a sentient being. He has a natural thirst for knowledge and he seeks truth not merely for the pleasure its attainment gives. Truth for its own sake has a peculiar fascination for him. Next comes the recognition of emotions and sentiments in the pursuit of the sublime and the beautiful for their own sake even if it causes pain. But the end of it all is in the recognition of a Personality, a Reality in which all that is ideal to us is realised. The conscious effort to realise it practically in our thoughts, feelings and actions transforms morality into spirituality. So the Pandit concludes, "Both quantitatively and qualitatively then the spiritual life, life in God, *Brāhmisthiti*, as our sages call it, is the consummation of morality, the complete realisation of the true good."

In regard to the reward and punishment of virtue and vice Pandit Tattvabhusan disavows the theology of retributory punishment. To him all punishments, if there be any, are remedial and the virtuous life is its own reward. To pursue a virtuous course of action for reward or to cease from a vicious course from fear of

punishment is to stultify moral life altogether. Self-satisfaction is a sufficient reward for the former and repentance is more than enough punishment for the latter. A really virtuous man deems it an insult if any kind of extraneous reward is held out to him for his virtue, nor does any really repentant man think any external punishment more painful than his consciousness of guilt. We carry our heaven and hell within.

CHAPTER VI

The Future Life

Is a belief in human immortality of vital importance to the spiritual life? Is it necessary as a bribe to make us virtuous? The late Francis William Newman said 'No.' Pandit Tattvabhushan says it may be true that our duties to one another will not suffer any deterioration if it were proved that man is not immortal, but the ultimate relation between belief in immortality and the spiritual life cannot be gainsaid. There is a relation of action and reaction between them. "Faith in the higher truths of religion necessarily gives rise to belief in the immortal life, and this belief in its turn serves to nurse and enliven our higher convictions. The very activity of our higher beliefs,—the beliefs, for instance, that we live, move and have our being in a supersensuous world, sustained by an Infinite Spirit, that this Supreme Spirit loves us with a love with which no earthly love can be compared, and that truth, love and righteousness are things for which the most valuable of earthly things should be, if necessary, sacrificed,—inevitably brings with it the faith that man's existence does not end with the destruction of his body, but that he is meant for life eternal." (*Philosophy of Brahmanism* p. 215.) To the man of the world who finds no time to think of the higher self the life eternal will appear hazy. The man of God neglects cultivating the idea of immortality at his peril. The Pandit justifies the fact

from his own experience that to lose faith in the future life is gradually to lose faith in religion. "I therefore heartily disparage all indifference as regards the cultivation of a living faith in immortality as of something which is of no practical importance to the spiritual life. It may not be of importance to the mere moralist,—to him who is contented with an outward purity of life and a certain amount of good work. But it is of supreme importance to life in God, to living in deep harmony with God's spirit, and, like the other truths of higher religion, like all beliefs in supersensuous realities, it should be kept vivid and active by study, meditation and devotional exercises." (*Ibid* p. 217.)

Our belief in the immortality of the soul is based on its immateriality as well as its spiritual destiny implied in its moral relation to God. Our doubt, on the other hand, in this respect arises out of the misgivings that the distinction between matter and soul may after all turn out to be a fancy of the philosopher and that man's moral relations with God may in the last analysis be found out to be a mere idealisation of his moral instincts. And these doubts are not very easy to overcome. A great deal of intellectual wrestling would be required to secure a sure footing in Idealism, in which lies the only remedy for the first part of the doubt. From the teaching of Idealism we learn "that our perception of matter is itself an unmistakable proof of our distinction from it. In our perception of matter, matter and mind are distinguished as object and subject, a distinction

which clearly shows that mind cannot be the product of matter." (*Ibid* p. 219) The doubt really draws some amount of strength from the quite unfounded conception of matter as something wholly independent of knowledge and the mind as only a by-product of matter. This is a mere dogmatic assertion, so much so that even Professors Tyndall and Huxley gave up all hopes of showing by experiment that that was the case. Dr. J. C. Bose's experiments tend to prove that there is no such thing as dead matter. But the Sceptics and Agnostics know not what they say. If they take their matter to be the ultimate *cause* endowed with the *power* to produce phenomena, these being mental categories they virtually give up their Materialistic and Agnostic positions. The readers will find a full discussion of the point in our author's *Roots of Faith*, in *Brahmajijnasa* and Lecture IV of the *Philosophy of Brahmaism*. As the Pandit says:— "The only satisfactory and unanswerable argument against Materialism of all sorts, popular, scientific and metaphysical, is the truth, arrived at by a close analysis of experience, that there is no such thing as matter as conceived by these theorists,—that the very conception of matter underlying these systems is self-contradictory." (*Philosophy of Brahmaism* p. 222) However, from a superficial view of the dependence of our mental life upon the brain a hasty conclusion may be arrived at that with the discontinuity of its connection with the brain the mind also ceases to operate. This question has been discussed at some length by Prof. James in his *Human Immortality* and

part of the discussion is quoted in Lecture IX of the *Philosophy of Brahmaism*. The Professor's analysis tends to show that the Physiologists have not been able from physically homogeneous phenomena, such as the mode of production of steam in a teakettle, to conclude that the discontinuance of the brain is in any way indicative of the cessation of our spiritual existence, because the functioning of the brain and the production of consciousness are not homogeneous. "In the production of consciousness by the brain," the Professor concludes, "the terms are heterogeneous natures altogether, and as far as our understanding goes, it is as great a miracle as if we said, 'thought is spontaneously generated or created out of nothing.' " (*Ibid* p. 228).

However, though there is undeniable concomittance between the soul and the body, there are two outstanding facts which bring out most clearly their equally undeniable discordance. "The first is the ever-changing nature of the latter and the identity of the former in the midst of constant changes. Our own actions, both physical and mental, and the action of natural forces upon the body are changing it every moment. The daily waste undergone by the body is recouped by nutrition. That is to say, the particles lost by the body in the course of its constant change are replaced by fresh particles. A continual rebuilding then is going on in our bodies. This rebuilding, scientific men say, is completed every three years ; that is, at the end of every three years not a single old particle remains in the body. So far, therefore,

as our bodies are concerned, each of us is really a different person from what he was three years back. But as souls we are the same persons we were in our childhood. Our knowledge and other mental possessions indeed increase, and many of our ideas change ; but the central personality, the 'I,' the ego, remains quite identical. We know that we are the same persons we were years ago inspite of the changes we have gone through. This brings out most clearly the distinction of our souls from our bodies and shows the absurdity of our mistaking the death of the body for the extinction of the soul." *bid* 229) This is one of the most absurd conclusions we may cherish against tangible facts of life. In the same life the ego lives in several bodies, the personality remaining unchanged. This may strike one as a fairy tale, but all the same it is a fact.

The other fact alluded to above is that after a certain stage the body decays. Sooner or later it must decay till death ends it altogether. Decay and dissolution is as natural to the body as its birth and growth. But the soul's case is quite different. Its powers and properties, instead of decaying, go on increasing with increasing years. We see that old men with their bodily infirmities are the natural guides and instructors of the younger generation bodily more vigorous than they. If the body and the soul were identical, the souls of dying old men would be found as useless as their bodies. But the very reverse of it is usually found. "The real strength and beauty of a truly virtuous and pious 'man often come out most brilliantly, like the glories of the

Indian sunset, when his physical existence is about to close. It is indeed true that the mental powers seem to fail in some cases as the powers of the body are impaired. But really it will be found that it is not the powers themselves, but the ability to put them into action, to express themselves in the form of visible and tangible facts, that fails. It is not wisdom, but the power to manifest it in speeches or writings, that fails in a man weakened by old age. It is not love or holiness, but the power to put it forth in touching expressions or far-reaching beneficent acts, that becomes more and more impossible with the failure of bodily strength. And it cannot but be so. The body, though not identical with the soul, is undoubtedly its organ of self-expression, and when the instrument is impaired, the expression cannot but suffer both in quality and quantity. But this does not in the least invalidate the argument from the ever-progressive nature of the soul. Since wisdom, love, holiness and other spiritual excellences are ever-growing and show no sign of natural decay—no mark of a limit they are destined to reach,—this is an indication that they are intended for unlimited growth, and that the soul, when its opportunities for growth and progress are closed here, must have another sphere of existence opened to it under conditions either similar to or different from those that obtain here." (*Ibid* p. 230, 231.)

The other basis of our belief in the immortality of the soul is to be found in the relation of man to God, which is strengthened by the contemplation of the object of human life as revealed in man's spiritual

nature. When the human soul is seen in its relation to God, we cannot help thinking that it is immortal. When the deeper truths of religion, such as God's love for man, are clearly grasped and the fact that no lover wishes to part with his beloved fully apprehended, as F. W. Newman argues in his *Hebrew Theism*, man's eternal life becomes a foregone conclusion. God, who loves us more than anybody else, will not assuredly let us go out of existence, thereby depriving himself of his beloved ones. "This argument", says the Pandit, "gains an irresistible power,—a power which every spiritually-minded man feels,—when we consider man's destiny in particular,—the training that he is receiving in the moral order that obtains in God's world." (*Ibid* p. 232.) Then, analysing man's social environments and commenting on their significance as regards the harmonious development of his spiritual nature, the Pandit remarks : "Both internal and external nature therefore seem evidently to co-operate in raising and perfecting man and reveal God's purpose in creating him. It seems clearly to be the one aim of creation to draw man nearer and nearer to God,—to make him more and more God-like by developing the higher powers of his nature. That being God's express purpose, it is quite incredible that the human soul can ever perish." (*Ibid* p. 233.) However, in view of the possibility of the argument from the immortality of the soul being shipwrecked on the doctrine of the unity of God and man and on the assumption of the finite being merged in the Infinite at liberation, the Pandit concludes : "Hence we see the value, for the doctrine

of human immortality, of the moral argument I have set forth in this lecture (Lec. IX of *The Philosophy of Brahmanism*.) Our distinction from God, our progressiveness and God's care of us as individuals—these truths must be distinctly seen before our faith in our immortal life can stand on an immovable basis." (*Ibid* p. 236.)

Thus placing our faith in human immortality beyond all reasonable doubt the Pandit proceeds to discover the conditions under which the soul, when it leaves the body, can possibly continue to exist. There are three suppositions, (1) a purely disembodied state, (2) a subtle or astral body and (3) rebirth. Pandit Tattvabhushan stoutly opposes the first view, though this is perhaps the opinion of Brahmas in general. To him some sort of *śarīra*, *sukshma* or otherwise, is needed for finite existence. He has much to say in favour of rebirth, which is an open question to Brahmas in general, though the Pandit discredits the idea of a rebirth as a lower animal, because this comes into conflict with the eternal progress of the soul, which all Brahmas agree in holding to be true.*

Pandit Tattvabhushan does not discountenance the idea of communication with disembodied spirits, on which question also Brahmas agree to differ. From the evidences of eminent scientific men as embodied in Professor Myers' *Human Personality* he entertains a hope in which many of us share, "that before the

* The question has been elaborately discussed in *Hindu Theism*, *The Vedanta and its Relation to Modern Thought*, and *Advaitavada, Prachya and Paschatya*.

present century closes the truth of human immortality will, instead of being confined to argument and spiritual experience, be placed on a purely experimental basis and will command the belief alike of the reflective and the unreflective, the spiritual and the unspiritual." (*Ibid* p. 239.)

CHAPTER VII

Spiritual Life

Pandit Tattvabhushan has rendered yeoman's service to the cause of spiritual life in the Brahma Samaj by persistently insisting on the necessity of the philosophical knowledge of God. But he has not failed to draw our attention to the fact that this is only the basis,—the first stage leading to higher stages —of a deeper consciousness of God. "This deeper consciousness," as he remarks in the first lecture of *Brahmasádhan*, "develops through the three stages of *Dháraná*, *Dhyān* and *Samádhi*. All are stages of the culture of *Jnán*, knowledge of God, as understood by our ancient teachers on *sádhan*. After these come the different stages of *bhakti* and *karma*, love of God and doing his will". At the outset it must be borne in mind that these stages are not successive, but interpenetrative, though knowledge can be given some sort of a logical priority to feeling and feeling to action. We know a beautiful thing before feeling an attraction for it, and then follows an endeavour to possess it. In every spiritual life these three in some form or other are intermixed though according to temperaments one aspect may be more or less emphasised. But an exclusive emphasis may shipwreck the life altogether. The exclusive culture of *Jnán* or *Yoga* may ultimately lead to *sunyaváda* or atheism, the exclusive culture of feeling or *bhakti* will be stranded in mere sentimentalism or even lead to idolatry, and the

extreme advocate of service may perchance find himself ultimately driven to barren ethicalism or worse to secularism, though one may call it by the high-sounding name, Humanism. This is, of course by way of warning.

Simply stated, *finding God* is the end of spiritual life and it means knowing God, loving him and doing his will. In the lower plane knowledge of God may mean a vague notion of a Creator of the world, or love of God only a formal offering of prayer occasionally coloured by devout feelings of some sort, and doing God's will may consist only in carrying out certain commandments. But spiritual life, life in God, means a great deal more, something higher and nobler than these. "If we are to believe those who are honoured by the world as knowers of God, God can be known so vividly and deeply that the light of such knowledge can fill our whole life and brighten all our journey. In other words, the consciousness of God as the Truth of truths, as the All-in-all, can colour and permeate all other forms of consciousness, outer and inner, so that we may consciously, as we do actually, live, move and have our being in him. Likewise, the love of God, instead of visiting us occasionally as a sentiment or emotion, may become an overmastering passion, not excluding, but transmuting and including, other passions and becoming the guiding impulse of life. In the same manner, the following of God's will, instead of being confined to abstinence from harm, or the performance of a stated number of duties, may be a living inspiration, a constant walk with God as his son and

servant, so that personal will is wholly merged in the divine and the son of God in us exclaims, 'I and the Father are one.' (B. S. p. 3).

In the spiritual exercises current in the Brahma Samaj *Árádhaná* or adoration is given the first place, and *Dhyán* comes next. Following this orthodox custom Pandit Tattvabhushan has dealt with *Árádhaná* in Lec. III and *Dhyán* in Lect. IV. I shall give the readers *Dhyán* first. This particular *sádhan*, as we have already seen, is divided into three subtle sub-classes,—*dháraná*, *dhyán* and *samádhi*. We go back to the *Brihadáranyaka* (II. 4 and IV. 5) in order to trace the processes by which the higher aspirant finds God and rises to the vision of the Absolute. Says Yájnavalkya, "O Maitreyi, the Self is verily to be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon. By seeing, hearing, thinking of and comprehending the Self, all this is comprehended." Though *seeing* is mentioned first, it really comes last, as Sankara takes *seeing*, *darsana*, to be the end, *siddhi*, for the attainment of which the others should be used as *sádhanás*, means. This *darsana* in its initial stage may be taken as the *dháraná* of Patanjali's scheme. Of course, all the *sádhanás* presuppose a course of ethical culture such as *sama*, *dama* etc., or *yama*, *niyama* etc. However, *dhárana* is the fixing of the mind on God and when the mind is thus fixed, *dhyán* appears as the uninterrupted flow of the mind towards God. But the mind gradually ceases to move about among various perceptions and fixes itself on the Reality of which these are all manifestations, ultimately identifying itself with that

Reality. This is realising God as the Self of one's self and endeavouring to rest in that realisation. It is to be remarked that even in "I am Brahman" the subtle distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped is never eliminated. This point has been fully discussed in *Brahmajijnásá* and Lec. X on the Vedanta. *Samádhi* is therefore deep absorption in God and it is always a conscious absorption. Though the modifications of the mind are not forgotten, they fail to disturb the consciousness of unity. This is *samádhi* through the *vyatireki pranáli*, the method of abstraction, the 'neti, neti,'—not this, not this—of the Upanishads. But there is a decidedly superior method, that of synthesis, *anavayí pranáli*. "The particular things or thoughts dismissed by the *vyatireki pranáli*, so that the underlying unity might be firmly grasped, are all to be brought back and realised as one with it, so that the whole scene before us, everything that we think of and the whole world of time and space implied in all our thinking, may be realised as God, as the *visvarupa*, his all-form or world-form. This form of *samádhi*,—its realisation in the hours of devotion, and its gradual expansion throughout our life—is essential if religion is to be made a matter of practical concern and not to be confined to the prayer-closet. The domestic circle, the crowded street, the noisy market place, the busy school or office, even the bloody battle-field, if it is unavoidable—all spheres and concerns of practical life—are to be realised as manifestations of the Absolute. And this realisation is possible only through the persevering and stre-

and these attributes, as culled from the *Upanishads* for the use of the Brahma Samaj, are either metaphysical or moral. The contemplation of one class of attributes promotes *aisvaryamúlā bhakti*, reverential piety, and that of the other class the *mádhuryamúlā* one, affectional piety, but both are necessary complements of the full spiritual life. From the linguistic standpoint *Arádhaná* may be said to be either *pratyaksha* or *paroksha*, direct or indirect, if God is addressed in the second or the third person. God may also be contemplated in the first person, as is notably the case in the "Nárada-Sanatkumára-Sambáda" of the *Chhándogya*. (Vide Lecture II). But the distinction is not a verbal one merely. "It is a deeper distinction, that of addressing God with a mere traditional belief or inferential knowledge of him and doing so with a direct consciousness of his presence. The distinction is so nice, that it is very difficult to grasp it, specially to apprehend it in the actual worship offered by a minister. Mere fervency of feeling, which is often mistaken for directness in *Arádhaná*, does not really constitute it, though such fervency is an important element of worship." (p. 32). But this traditional belief is not to be accepted as a safe basis for spiritual life and in our actual practice of such *paroksha* *árádhaná* there is a great deal of groping in the dark in search of emotional fervency. Quite different is the case with *pratyaksha* *árádhaná*. "As the Object of worship stands revealed to the worshipper, filling his whole existence and transcending it,—stands in all his glory, beauty and sweetness,—all that darkened his vision heretofore and

chilled the fountains of his emotions is removed, the flood-gates of feeling are opened, and an outburst of reverence, admiration and love, impossible in lower forms of worship, goes up towards the True, the Good and the Beautiful and gives the soul a foretaste of heaven." (p. 37) It is to be remarked in passing that there is scarcely any distinction between this kind of *Árádhaná* and *Dhyán*, because the former is not possible without the worshipper being permeated through and through with the divine presence which it is the object of the latter to cultivate. To tell the truth, without *Dhyán*, the direct realisation of the presence of God, adoration is a mere apology for it. However, when the worshipper thus stands face to face with the object of his worship and enjoys his beauty and holiness, prayer comes to him as a matter of course. After *Árádhaná* prayer is a most natural attitude towards God,—an attitude essentially necessary for realising the object of spiritual exercises. Seeing the All-Beautiful, how can the worshipper refrain from praying for the removal of his ugliness, and coming face to face with the All-holy, will he not want the purging of his sins ? "The soul must be in a begging and expectant attitude towards God,—an attitude in which a deep sense of want and entire dependence on God are combined. This attitude completes the ideal state of worship. Stop short of it, and you will see that certain things are unattainable by you. In fact it seems to me that the very root of sin,—egotism, a feeling of false independence or separateness from God—is irremovable except by prayer. *Árádhaná* and *Dhyán* will carry you far, very

far, towards God and will wash very much of your egotism. But its inner kernel will yet remain and cause you trouble until you throw yourself unreservedly on the mercy of God. When this last condition is fulfilled, the grace of God flows in an uninterrupted course into the soul and completes its union with him. Now, true prayer is never without its response. As Brahmananda Kesavchandra has truly said, aspiration and inspiration are like the ingoing and the outgoing breath—the one invariably following the other." (p. 91).

It is not to be understood that the spiritual life merely consists in the fulfilment of the conditions of worship technically so-called. Nothing of the kind. Though it is absolutely necessary, a stable spiritual life indicates a great deal more. The effect of worship should spread over the whole of life. The spiritual man, the man who has attained *Brāhmisthitt*, the aim and object of life, "feels that not only the discharge of life's more solemn duties, but also ordinary dealings with his fellow-beings, and even the enjoyment of life's comforts and pleasures, should partake of the character of worship. And he sees that this is impossible if his devotions are hasty and superficial. To expect practical life to be strong, holy and sweet without deep and fervent devotions is a most idle expectation. If a plant is to be vigorous and beautiful, its roots must be watered. A deep and rapid stream implies a vast accumulation of water in its source. The importance of a diligent cultivation of these devotional feelings cannot therefore be exaggerated.

And the cultivation of these feelings should not be confined to particular hours in daily life. To keep up the spirit of worship and let it pervade and permeate the whole of life, direct intercourse with God should be sought not only at all important points of daily life—the beginning and close of the day, the daily meals, the beginning of the principal work of the day, and so on,—but as often as possible during the course of the day, even in the thick of daily labour, the eyes should be turned towards God, and praise and prayer should go up to him from the heart. It is only thus, by constantly keeping company with the Divine Spirit, that the true standpoint from which all things should be seen and all work done can be kept up.” (Pp. 111, 112.)

CHAPTER VIII

The Vedanta

Pandit Tattvabhushan's views on the Vedanta are set forth in his *Hindu Theism, Vedanta and its Relation to Modern Thought, Life and Teachings of Sankaracharya, Philosophy of Sankaracharya* (in Natesan's *Sri Sankaracharya*), *Advaitaváda, Práchya O Páschátya*, Introduction to the Devanagar and English edition of the *Ten Upanishads*, *Theism of the Upanishads* and Introductions to the Sanskrit and Bengali editions of the *Chhándogya* and *Brihadáranyaka* Upanishads. We may also refer to many articles in exposition of Vedantism contributed by him to the *Indian Messenger*, the English organ of the Sadharan Brahma Samaj, specially to eight of them on the philosophy of Yájnavalkya and that of Indra and Prajápati about to be published in the form of a pamphlet. These last, *with the Introductions to the *Chhándogya* and the *Brihadáranyaka* give his maturest thoughts on Vedantism and show the earliest bifurcation of Vedantic thought into the two schools of Unqualified and Qualified Monism. One peculiarity of Pandit Tattvabhushan's treatment of the Vedanta is the emphasis he puts on the study of Vedantism in its most ancient literature, the Upanishads, whereas most of the recent scholars dealing with the subject attach what seems to him an exaggerated importance to later works,—works which accept the Upanishads as the ultimate authority on the doctrines taught by them and are exegetical and controversial rather than philosophical in their

character. The Pandit shows, specially in the second of his works mentioned above, that the undue importance attached to later Vedantist literature has really led to a general misunderstanding as to the very meaning of the term 'Vedanta.' He shows that this term, in its primary and original sense, means the Upanishads, which are chronologically the *latest portions* of the Vedas, and philosophically the *essence or purport* of all Vedic teachings. Later works systematising or expounding the teachings of the Upanishads are Vedantas or the Vedanta only in a secondary sense. The Upanishads themselves speak of themselves, for instance in the *Mundaka* III, 2.6 and the *Svetásvatara* VI. 22, as the Vedanta, and eminent expounders of the Upanishads and of later Vedantic works like Sankara and Ramanuja give the name 'Vedanta' or 'Vedantas' to the Upanishads and to nothing else. The next in importance, in Vedantic literature, is the *Brahma-sútram* or *Vedanta-sútram*, called by various other names, which systematises and expounds the Upanishadic teaching and is often erroneously identified with the Vedanta, but which is Vedanta only in a secondary sense. The third in importance in the same literature is the *Bhagavadgítá*, which gives the teachings of the Upanishads, somewhat tinged by those of the Sankhya Philosophy, in one of their earliest forms and presents a picture of the ideal Vedantic *sádhaka*. These three,—the principal Upanishads as a whole, the *Brahmasútram* and the *Bhagavadgítá*, are called the three *prasthána*s,—departures, varied forms, distinct institutes,—of the Vedantic

doctrine. The first is called *Sruti Prasthána*, the scriptural form, the second *Nyáya Prasthána*, the logical form, and the third *Smriti Prasthána*, the ethical or practical form of Vedantic teachings. Later Vedantic literature, such as commentaries on the *Prasthána-trayam* or original works expounding its teachings, are the Vedanta or Vedantas in a tertiary sense. Pandit Tattvabhushan practically confines his exposition of the Vedanta to the Upanishads and the other two *prasthánas*, referring to their expounders only occasionally and incidentally except in the short treatises on Sankara named above. Of the Upanishads he accepts the well-known twelve,—*Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Mándúkya, Taittíriya, Aitareya, Chhándogya, Brshadáraṇyaka, Svetásvatara* and *Kaushitaki*,—as the most authoritative ones. Their authoritativeness is based upon the facts that (1) the *Brahmasútram* seems to refer to them and them only, (2) Sankara, the earliest reviver of the Upanishadic religion in medieval times wrote commentaries on the first ten of them and (3) they contain Vedic speculation only and not such later Puranic doctrines as those of incarnation and image-worship.

One thing already briefly noticed raises the Upanishads decidedly above all later Vedantic works, namely the spirit of freedom that breathes in them. While the latter appeal to them as ultimate authorities and regard such an appeal as final, precluding further reasoning, the Upanishads have no such authorities before them. They indeed mention many thinkers in whose name they often speak, but they do not set them up

as authorities to be implicitly accepted. The Upanishadic sages differ with one another on the most important subjects though a certain amount of unity is discernable in their views. From these differences and from the fact that they use highly metaphysical conceptions to which ordinary thought do not and cannot rise, it is evident that they thought freely, unfettered by the utterances recorded in the earlier parts of the Vedas,—the *Mantras* and the *Bráhmanas*,—which, along with their own utterances, became independent authorities in a later age. But though free thinkers, and in many cases profound thinkers, so far as some of the conceptions used by them indicate, they have not left any clear and definite method of philosophical thinking. Pandit Tattvabhusan does not find any such method even in the great commentators of the Upanishads and the other two Vedantic institutes and in the more or less original works on Vedantism. Blind dependence on the scriptures seems to fetter and cripple their speculations. But there are, he thinks, pregnant hints in the Upanishads, specially in the larger prose Upanishads, the *Chhándogya*, *Brihadáranyaka* and *Kaushitaki*, which may be followed up and reduced to a system. If any definite method existed at the time of the founders of Vedantism, he thinks it is lost. In following up the thoughts scattered throughout the Upanishads and bringing them under a system, which our author attempts in his works mentioned above, he is professedly guided by his own method,—a method for which he is largely indebted, as we have said in the early chapters of this book, to Kant and Hegel and their followers. He thinks that there

is a substantial agreement between the system of the Upanishads and the Absolute Idealism of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians and that the help of these western thinkers may justly be availed of in understanding the profound thoughts of our ancient sages. However, while thus giving precedence to western thinkers as to the method of philosophical thought, Pandit Tattvabhusan nevertheless regards our *rishis* and *acháryas* as far in advance of the former in *sádhan* proper,—in realising through the higher processes of meditative, emotional and practical culture the truths obtained by logical processes. In this latter respect India, he thinks, has much to teach the west, as in science and philosophical method it has much to learn from it.

The fundamental principle of Idealism,—the relativity of sense and thought, of subject and object, of the one and the many, is, our author thinks, taught by Yájnavalkya in II. 4, IV. 5, and other portions of the *Brihadáraṇyaka* Upanishad. “Verily the Self, O Maitreyí”, says he to his wife, “is to be seen, heard, thought of and deeply meditated upon. When the Self is seen, heard, thought of and deeply meditated upon, all this world is known.” The Self thus spoken of is not merely the individual self which each person thinks as exclusively his, but a Universal Self comprehending all objects and manifesting itself as the source and support of all individual selves. As Yájnavalkya says, “This Bráhmaṇa caste, this Kshatriya caste, these worlds, these deities, all these beings, all this is the Self.” “This unity of subject and object”, says our author on p. 26 of his *Theism of the Upani-*

shads, "is emphasised by Yájnavalkya with the declaration that the Bráhmanas, the Kshatriyas, the creatures, the deities, everything, should disown,—'parádát'—him who looks for any of these things elsewhere than in the Self, the purport of which seems to be that no real knowledge of anything is gained unless it is seen in essential relation to the one Universal Self." That objects known are mere abstractions apart from the subject knowing them, is illustrated by the fact that the sound of a drum, a conch-shell or a harp cannot be caught hold of except by catching hold of the instruments and their players. However, the unity and infinitude of the Self is more clearly suggested by Yájnavalkya in another dialogue than in this. It is done in the dialogue between him and Gárgí, a lady inquirer, in sec. 8 of chap. iii of the same Upanishad. Gárgí asks the sage, "In what are all things contained?" The sage gives the right answer, "In space" (ákáse). Gárgí then asks "In what is space itself contained?" a question which never occurs to unreflecting people, for they regard space as a self-contained reality supporting other things but needing no support for itself. But Gárgí, long before Kant, saw its relativity to mind, and so did the sage to whom she put her question. Therefore, "When Yájnavalkya said that it is the Akshara, the Imperishable or Absolute, in which space is woven like warp and woof ('otah protah') she was satisfied and spoke no more." (*Theism of the Upanishads* p. 21). It is space, its manifoldness, the externality it introduces into things, which breaks the unity of the world. When space is seen in

relation to the spaceless, and things external to one another are found to be necessarily related to consciousness, to which nothing can be external, then is the unity, indivisibility and infiniteness of the Self truly seen. The Upanishadic sage who saw this truth even more deeply than Yájnavalkya, who at any rate teaches it more clearly than he, is Sanatkumára, who gives a long exposition of it in the seventh chapter of the *Chhándogya*. There he leads his pupil Nárada "up a ladder of twenty-one conceptions the lowest of which is name (*náman*) and the highest the infinite (*bhúman*). This reminds one of the gradual march of conceptions in Hegel's *Logic* from Being up to the Absolute Idea. But the analogy ends here. One does not see, except occasionally here and there, how one conception rises out of another and what makes one higher than that which precedes it. There is no real dialectic in the movement. But whatever may have been his method, Sanatkumára seems to have arrived at a true idea of the Infinite, and Prof. Max Muller truly says in his Gifford lectures on Psychological Religion that no truer definition of the Infinite than what our philosopher gives has ever since been given. Sanatkumára says:—'When one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the finite.'"*(Ibid* pp. 12, 13).

The purport of all this is that when the real nature of the Self as the reality to which all things are necessarily related, is seen, nothing else than the Self is seen. It is seen not as

an abstract subject unrelated to objects, but as an all-comprehensive unity-in-difference. Sanatkumára's visions of the *Bhúman*, described in the concluding lines of the chapter in question and partly reproduced in the *Theism of the Upanishads* (pp. 12, 13) bear out what we have said. However, the Upanishadic sage who most clearly sees the truth of Absolute Idealism and gives the most unambiguous expression to it seems to be Indra, who teaches it to Pratardana in the third chapter of the *Kaushitaki*. He emphasises as much as Yájnavalkya the abstract nature of what are called 'objects' apart from their relation to the subject. But he sees clearly, what Yájnavalkya and his followers do not see, that the subject also, apart from objects, is an abstraction, concrete reality consisting in the unity-in-difference of subject and object. Giving the name *prajnámátráh* (subjective elements) to our ten powers of knowing and acting, and that of *bhútamátráh* (objective elements) to the ten classes of objects and actions related to those powers, Indra says :—“These ten elements of the objective world exist in relation to consciousness, and the ten elements or phases of consciousness exist in relation to the objective world. If there were no elements of the objective world, there would be no elements of consciousness. If there were no elements of consciousness, there would be no elements of the objective world. No form or entity is possible from only one of the two sides. This (*i. e.* concrete reality) is not many (but one). As the circumference of the wheel of a car is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, so are these elements

of the objective world placed on the elements of consciousness and the elements of consciousness placed on life. This life is the conscious Self,—blissful, unfading and immortal.....He is the Guardian of the world. He is the Sovereign of the world. He is the Lord of all. One should know him thus,—‘He is my self’” (*Ibid*, pp. 33, 34. *Kaushitaki III.*)

But the alternations of waking, dreaming and sleeping (*िाग्रत्, स्वप्ना* and *सुषुप्ति*) in our daily life, with the nature and meaning of which the Upanishadic philosophers deal largely, and the more general phenomena of the appearance of knowledge in us and its disappearance from us moment by moment, of which waking, dreaming and sleeping are only particular instances, seem to belie the doctrine of absolute relativity taught by Indra. *Yājnavalkya*, though he sees the relativity of objects to the subject, does not see that of the latter to the former, and in this respect he is at one with several other Upanishadic sages as also with the general trend of popular thought. The objects of sense,—colours, sounds, smells &c.,—seem to pass away and only the subject of these sensations seems to persist. In waking life these sensations seem to come from things independent of the self, but in dreams the self is seen to have the power of producing them even in the absence of external objects. The popular idea of the duality of self and not-self is therefore a mistake. The duality of subject and object is only apparent and is the work of the self. That even this apparent duality is impermanent and not a part of the self’s true nature, is evident from the state of dreamless

sleep in which the self is reduced to an undifferentiated unity without even the apparent duality of subject and object which is found in waking and dreaming. Thus argues Yájnavalkya in the third and fourth sections of the fourth chapter of the *Brihadá-ranyaka* and comes to the conclusion that after death our selves, which are only appearances of the Absolute Self, will be permanently merged in the latter as they are daily merged in it in dreamless sleep. That we are daily re-awakened to a state of difference and are re-born repeatedly to an indefinite series of lives, is due to the continuance of desire in our minds. When desire is entirely eliminated by strenuous spiritual culture, there follows liberation in the sense explained. In teaching this doctrine Yájnavalkya is supported, as we have already said, by some other Upanishadic *rishis*, specially by his own teacher, Uddálaka Áruni, in the sixth chapter of the *Chhándogya*, where he utters and expounds the well-known *mahāvákyā* (great saying) "Tattvamasi",—Thou art That. In fact Yájnavalkya only elaborates by his superior power of exposition the unqualified Monism taught by Áruni,—not indeed taught for the first time in Vedic literature, but undoubtedly set forth in a regular form for the first time.

But Prajápati in the *Chhándogya* (Chap. viii. 7-12) and Indra in the *Kaushítaki* (chap. iii) see Yájnavalkya's mistake. They see that in discussing waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep Yájnavalkya ignores a fourth (*turiya* or *chaturtha*) state which the other three states imply. These changes, while showing a

changeful consciousness on the one hand, presuppose on the other hand a consciousness which remains unchanged and identical throughout the changes. And the identity of a consciousness amidst changes is possible only when the knowledge of the changes remains as objects even when the changes are over as changes. That this is the case in all changes is most clearly seen in re-waking. In that state we get back all that we lost in dreamless sleep. And our getting them back just as they were before sleep shows their persistence during sleep. But how else could they persist except in an ever-waking consciousness,—one which, though sleepless, is essentially one with our consciousness, for when we awake, the objects of our consciousness re-appear as *ours*? Though very briefly, Prajápati says all this in substance and draws the important distinction ignored by Yájnavalkya,—that between the embodied and individual self on the one hand and the Universal Self on the other, both related to and yet distinct from each other. Yájnavalkya's difficulty that, in the absence of our organs of knowledge, knowledge in the form of the difference of subject and object would be impossible, Prajápati meets by showing that the organs are only instruments, the real source of knowledge being the self which with "the *manas*, its divine eye, sees all the desirable objects that are in the divine regions and rejoice." (*Chhándogya* viii. 12.5). The reader will find the whole subject fully discussed in the second lecture of our author's *Theism of the Upanishads* and in the pamphlet we have already referred

to. We have here space enough only to state briefly that Prajápati's Brahmaloka, briefly mentioned in the passage referred to and far more fully described by Chitra in the first chapter of the *Kaushitaki*, is very different, as could not but be, from Yájnavalkya's. The individual self is not only not merged in the Universal, conceived as an abstract unity without difference, but it really enters a society of liberated selves who worship the Universal,—conceived as a Person,—worship him both as one with them and yet distinct from them. Brahmaloka or the state of liberation, *mukti*, is discussed by our author with reference to the views of the *Brahmasútram* and of Sankara in the last chapter of his *Hindu Theism* and the last lecture of his *Vedanta and its Relation to Modern Thought*.

The Vedantic system of ethics and spiritual culture is set forth at some length in lectures ix and x of our author's *Vedanta and its Relation to Modern Thought* and in lecture iii of his *Theism of the Upani-shads*. We shall content ourselves with a very brief statement of what Pandit Tattvabhushan regards as the basic principle of Vedantic ethics and spiritual endeavour. This principle is *átmaprem*, self-love, and its nature and applications are explained in the *Brihadáraṇyaka* I. 4.7, II. 4 and IV. 5, the latter passages being practically identical. In the first passage the Self is declared to be dearer than son, dearer than riches and dearer than everything else, because it is nearer than anything else and it is taught that the Self should be worshipped with love (*priyam*). Yájnavalkya

in the latter two passages declares the Self as identical with all things and teaches that our love for wife, child, riches, race and all other things dear to us is for the sake of the Self and not for these things and persons thought of as apart from the Self. In other words, it is in so far as we realise the presence of the Self in things and persons that we love them. When therefore the Self is known as identical with all things and persons, they all become dear. "*Ātmanas tu kámáya sarvam priyam bhavati.*" The *Isopanishad* echoes this sentiment in its sixth and seventh verses,—"He who sees all things in the Self and the Self in all things, does not hate any one, for that reason. When to the wise man the Self has become all things, what delusion or what sorrow can there be to him who sees unity?" The same teaching is to be found more or less in all the principal *Upanishads*. The second or *Brahmánanda* *Valli* of the *Taittiriya* and the seventh chapter,—*Nárada-Sanatkumára-sambáda*—of the *Chhándogya* specially emphasise the *ánanda* or blissfulness of the realisation of the Infinite. Thus in connection with what we have said of the culture of *jnána*, knowledge, in the earlier parts of this chapter, it will be seen that the *Vedanta* teaches all the elements of true piety,—knowledge, love and holiness,—and is not a mere *jnána sástra*, as it is often wrongly represented. To the superficial reader it does not seem to teach anything about God's care for man. But apart from the story of *Brahmavidyá* in the *Kenopanishad*, and the description of the *Deva-yána* and the *Brahmaloka* in the first chapter of the

Kaushitaki, both of which speak of God's solicitude for the welfare of his creatures, Pandit Tattvabhushan shows in the third lecture of his *Theism of the Upanishads* that our love of ourselves and of others, when it is truly understood in the light of the Upanishadic teaching, is really the love of God for man and the love of man for God. The *Bhagavadgita* and the earlier Puranas like the *Vishnu* and the *Bhagavata*, which understand the Upanishadic teaching on love in this sense, base their *bhakti* teachings on this doctrine of *ātmaprem*. It is when, in the later Puranas, the Vedantic ideal of the direct knowledge of God was lost sight of, and mythical stories of God's doings took its place, that the culture of *bhakti* took a gross and sensuous form. Pandit Tattvabhushan teaches a return to that ideal in all his writings more or less, specially in the interests of emotional and practical religion.

CHAPTER IX

The Bhagavadgita

In the *Gítámáhátmya* the *Gítá* is said to be milk drawn from the Upanishads as cows.

To the *Gítá* literature, enormous as it is, Pandit Tattvabhushan has made not an insignificant contribution by his Rájá Súrya Ráo Lectures on *Krishna and the Gítá* and his newly published Devanagar and English edition of this third institute of the Vedanta. In the lectures he has discussed the origin and growth of the Krishna legend. We shall take up the subject in our next chapter, that on 'Vaishnavism.' There is no doubt that the *Gítá* is a more or less late addition to the original *Mahábhárata*, and it seems likely that the author of the *Bhagavadgítá* was inspired by the *Kathopanishad* to allegorise the Supreme Reason as Krishna driving the chariot of Arjuna and advising him not to surrender to momentary impulses like one whose senses are unmanageable like the naughty horses of a driver. The Pandit says that the author of the *Gítá* probably believed Krishna to be a historical person, perhaps even as an incarnation of God, but that the story of Krishna's uttering the *Gítá* in the battlefield as Arjuna's charioteer may be a creation of his devout imagination. (*Krishna and the Gítá* p. 97). To the question, 'How is such imagination justifiable in a pious man?' the Pandit replies: "Krishna could declare himself and Arjuna and the author of the *Gítá* could believe him to be God incarnate only in the sense in which

the national scriptures had taught them to do so. The representation of an individual as identical with the Universal Self, as we find it in the *Gítá*, is not a unique instance in our national literature. Since the days of the Upanishads it has again and often been taught that the fully awakened soul, one which has been blessed with a knowledge of its true relation to the Absolute, sees that it is essentially one with the latter and fearlessly declares itself to be so. The typical and classical example is that of Indra in the *Kaushitaki Upanishad* in his colloquy with Pratardana." (*Ibid* P. 98.) After a long discussion on the Hindu doctrine of incarnation our author says: "The Krishna of the *Bhagavadgítá*, when truly understood, is seen to be the Infinite and the Absolute in us; and the Arjuna of the *Bhagavadgítá*, when similarly understood, is seen to be the finite and the relative in us." (P. 119.)

Pandit Tattvabhushan has summarised his deliberations on the *Gítá* in his lec. xii, which he has again incorporated in the introduction to his edition of the book. So I think my duty will be well accomplished if that summary be given here with the necessary additions and alterations, specially additions from the lectures themselves. "The *Gítá* is usually divided by the commentators into three *shatkas*, three parts, each consisting of six chapters. The first is called the *Karma-shatka*, the second the *Bhaktishatka*, and the third the *Jnánashatka*. The division cannot be pronounced exact, as *karma*, *bhakti* and *jnána* are promiscuously dealt with in all the three *shatkas*. It could hardly be otherwise, as these elements of religious life imply and de-

pend upon one another, and can scarcely be treated of separately. According to some European writers on the *Gitá*, the original poem closed with the twelfth chapter, and the last six chapters are later additions. The internal evidence favours this view." (Pp. 144-145).

In his lecture on the relation of the *Gitá* to the Sankhya Philosophy our author says: "The *Gitá* is deeply influenced by the Sánkhya Philosophy. Its doctrine of *karma* is, in the first place, a Sankhya doctrine, though gradually it also became a part of the later Vedanta system. In *karma*, work, we inevitably come into close contact with Prakriti, who thus binds us to her in proportion to the zeal, assiduity and intensity with which we work. (To the author of the *Gitá*) Prakriti is a power or aspect of God; contact with her, therefore, and a perpetuation of her activity are not to him.....absolute evils, and yet his Sankhya associations make him fret and froth against the bondage that Prakriti imposes upon us through work. His reconciliation of *karma*, which leads to bondage, and the pursuit of *kaivalya*, isolation from Prakriti, consists in his doctrine of *nishkáma karma*, disinterested work.....The positive aspect of *nishkáma karma* is *karmárpánam* or *Brahmárpánam*, resigning work to God,—realising that the real agent is God, the Universal Self, and not the individual. But apart from the fact that the individual, as a part or aspect of the Universal, is so far an agent, and cannot reason itself out of agency, the other and real difficulty of the doctrine is that in attributing activity to the Self, even in its Universal aspect, we directly go against the fundamental Sankhya doctrine of the

essential inactivity of Purusha. The author of the *Gítá* knows this and ever and anon, in his book, denies that the Self is really active.....But this Sankhya doctrine of the inactivity of the self is crossed and contradicted in numerous other passages by the truly Vedantic doctrine of an active God.....The fact is, that notwithstanding his faith in the monistic Theism of the *Upanishads* the author of the *Gítá* cannot shake off his Sankhya predilections." (Pp. 146—151). The credit of the *Gítá* lies in the fact that it vaguely suggests a reconciliation. The Pandit remarks in his summary that "in several points this attempted reconciliation is not quite successful, but is deeply suggestive and helpful to a true solution of the great problems of thought and life." (Pp. 395-396).

In treating of the relation of the *Gítá* to the Yoga Philosophy the Pandit says : "Yoga as a system of spiritual discipline seems to be very ancient. We find it outlined, though not named as a distinct system, in the earliest *Upanishads*, the *Chhándogya*, the *Brihadá-ranyaka*, the *Aitareya*, the *Taittiríya* and the *Kaushí-taki*. In the verse *Upanishads*, the *Katha* and the *Svetásvatara* for instance, which are later, and perhaps belong to the earlier *Sútra* period, the system is actually named, and in the latter even takes a definite shape. In the *Gítá* it appears in a fuller form." (P. 155.) "Coming now to the *Bhagavadgítá*, we find it taking no cognisance of the *vibhútis* or powers which occupy such a prominent place in the Yoga philosophy. To it the term *vibhúti* has a very different meaning. The *vibhútis* named in the tenth chapter are particular manifesta-

tions of God,—manifestations towards which the worshipper's attitude should be one of reverence. They are objects not to be acquired, but to be admired and adored. That the *Gītā* idea of the Godhead is very different from Patanjali's, I need scarcely say.” (P. 171.) “While Patanjali's God is inactive, having nothing to do with nature, the God of the *Gītā* is ever-active, ever directing the course of nature and finite souls.” (P. 176). *Yoga* has a practical as well as a devotional aspect. In the forty-eighth verse of the second chapter *yoga* is defined as evenness or equanimity,—the quality of not being moved by success or failure in action. Referring to verse 25, ch. VI—‘*Ātmasamsthām manah kritva na kinchidapi chintayet*’—“fixing the mind on the self, one should not think of anything whatever,”—the Pandit says : “It should be seen that *yoga* is not meditation, with which it is often confused, and that far less is it adoration or prayer, and least of all, ordinary thinking, be it on the sublimest subjects. It is realising—seeing—the Self, the infinite Self which is the Self of each one of us and the Self of the Universe. A whole system of philosophy lies at the back of this practice,—a system which must be mastered at all costs before there can be any success in *yoga*.” (P. 183.)

The relation between the Vedanta and the *Bhagavad-gītā* is so close that the latter is called the *Smṛiti Prasthāna* of the Vedanta doctrine. In spite of its Sankhya proclivities the *Gītā* teaches on the whole an impressive form of Vedantism. The unity of God with nature and the individual self, the central truth of Vedantism, is briefly but clearly expressed in

the 20th verse of the tenth chapter. In verses 4 and 5 of the seventh chapter this identity finds a more detailed expression. "They are important as calling the objective world the lower and the subjective the higher *prakriti*, nature, of God, and as showing that the author had at least a vague apprehension of the true dialectic of thought,—of the fact that the subject both makes and overlaps the distinction of subject and object and that its unity-in-difference is the true ultimate reality. To the *Gítá* God is both the efficient and the material cause of the world, even what is called the material world being a part or aspect of his nature." (P. 210.) "The world does not exhaust God,—he transcends it. This thought the author tries to express in utterances which seem to contradict one another. The struggle is seen most clearly in the ninth chapter." (P. 211.) "Notwithstanding such unsatisfactory and apparently contradictory expressions,.....there is not a single word in the whole *Gítá* which lends any countenance to the theory of illusion, which tells us that things are only appearances and the creative power of God is a false notion which disappears as soon as real knowledge is acquired. The word *Máyá* is indeed used here and there, but not in the sense in which the typical *Máyá-vádin* uses it." (P. 212.) "The *Gítá* recognises both the immanent and transcendent, the *saguna* and *nirguna*, aspects of God. But unlike some of the *Upanishads*, and unlike the *Brahma Sútras*, it puts great emphasis on the former and insists upon its proper realisation. This teaching is found specially in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth chapters, taking in the eleventh the most

impressive form. In the tenth we are taught to fix our mind on particular objects and persons displaying power, grandeur or beauty in extraordinary degrees, as manifestations of God. This is the form of meditation called *Pratika Upásaná* in the *Upanishads*. The mind being thus prepared for a higher flight, it is taught to look upon the whole world as the manifestation of God.The eleventh chapter of the *Gítá* is a most glorious chapter in the whole record of the world's spiritual experience. I do not think it has an equal anywhere else. (Pp. 213-214). "In its teaching on *bhakti* the *Gítá* is far in advance of the *Brahmasútras*, and in a sense of the *Upanishads* too, which, though teaching love to the Supreme Self, do not bring out clearly and prominently the relation of man to God as of a finite person to an Infinite Person, the one enjoying the infinite love and constant care of the other" (P. 397).

Speaking of the *Gítá* teaching on Liberation Pandit Tattvabhushan says : "That the difference between the individual and the Universal Self is everlasting, persisting even in the state of final liberation, is indeed nowhere taught in the *Gítá* in so many words. But that this is the doctrine held by the author, may be gathered from the whole trend of his teachings." (P. 216) "But I may as well mention here that our idea of endless progress we seek for in vain in either the *Vedanta* or the *Bhagavadgítá*" (P. 209).

Comparing the *Gítá* ideal of knowledge with the Western ideal, the Pandit says in his summary : "The author of the *Bhagavadgítá*, though not clearly aware of a method such as the Dialectical, had a wonderfully

synthetic imagination, which prevented him from being satisfied with the halting and one-sided systems referred to, and led him to the instinctive grasp of a system of Idealism unifying apparently conflicting but really harmonious tendencies of thought and life. In this lies his chief claim to the honour which is so universally accorded to him". (P. 398.)

Speaking of the philosophical basis of spiritual culture Pandit Tattvabhushan teaches that the doctrine of unity-in-difference is the real basis not only of *bhakti* and *karma*, but also of *jñána*. Dualism worships an unknown God, a God which is at the same time finite, as he is limited by man and nature. Such a God cannot command our whole-hearted *bhakti*. On the other hand, Unqualified Monism, by denying the reality of the finite, the *sádhaka* or aspirant, makes the Infinite, the *Sádhya*,—the object of aspiration,—meaningless. However, "the *Gítá* teachings on *Bhakti* closely follow the lines laid down in the *Upanishads*. The fundamental teaching of both on the subject is the direct realisation of the Infinite, the intellectual aspect of which is *jñána* and the emotional aspect *ánanda* or *bhakti*. *Jñána* and *bhakti* therefore are inseparably related and all teachings that tend to separate the two and seek the one in exclusion of the other are fundamentally incorrect and injurious.....Of the two processes of realising the the Infinite the *anvaya* and the *vyatireka*, the *Gítá* follows the latter in its sixth chapter and the former in the eleventh. In its twelfth chapter it commends the worship of the *Saguna* Brahman, taught in the

eleventh chapter, as making smooth the way to the *Nirguna*, and points out the difficulties in the way of those who would directly grasp the *Nirguna*.....His *saguna* worship is not however the worship of images or finite gods, which, according to him, is not the proper worship of God. (Pp. 399-400).

Coming to the *Gítá* teaching on *Karma* our author says : "The *Gítá* teaching on *karma* or work is the most characteristic teaching of the book and is perhaps the one which is most valued by its admirers". (P. 315). In the beginning "Krishna, in trying to cure Arjuna of his depression and induce him to fight, praises *karma* and appeals to his instincts as a warrior and prince, and when he sees that his pupil is deaf to these appeals, sets before him the ideals of *buddhi-yoga*, *karma yoga* and *saṃādhi*,—ideals of a spiritual condition from which he might act—might do apparently the most fearful things—and yet incur no sin and bondage, things that Arjuna feared most". (P. 317.) The *Gítá* seeks to strike a mean between the followers of the *karmakánda* and those of the *jnánakánda*. An early attempt at this harmony was made in the *Isopanishad*. The *Gítá*'s is a most successful attempt. "At first it grapples with the *karmakándis*, the followers of Jaimini, to whom there is no higher ideal than the life of ceremonial practices and their worldly and other-worldly results. It shows that there are higher truths than these sectaries know of and higher motives of *karma* than they appeal to. On entering this higher sphere, however, our author feels the power of the logic of the opposite school, the Sankhya Philosophy, and is so far led away

by it as to pronounce the Self as essentially inactive, a doctrine which cuts down the roots of his doctrine of *karma*. His Vedantism and his strong common sense, however, come to his rescue and he propounds the doctrine of an ever-active God and those of *nishkáma karma* and *Brahmárpána*, which constitute his refutation of the opponents of *karma*.....“This leads us to the *Gítá* doctrine of *nishkáma karma*, desireless or disinterested work, in the course of which it is shown in what sense the *yogin* who has attained unity with God has, and in what sense he has not, desires. It is shown that the characteristics which the *Gítá* gives of a *sthitaprajna* person, a person who is established in wisdom, indicate an ideal of character in which our appetites and propensities, instead of being starved or suppressed as in the ascetic scheme, undergo a process of purification and become parts of the all-comprehensive desire of union with God. God being all in all, the abandonment of desire for finite things means only abandoning their pursuit as objects independent of him. As parts or manifestations of him the desire for them is a part of love to God. This leads to the exposition of the doctrine of *Brahmárpánam*, giving over all things to God, and of *karma* as *yajna*,—doing all things in the spirit of divine worship. (Pp. 402—404).

Speaking in his twelfth lecture on the *Gítá* system of practical morals, Pandit Tattvabhusan says: “As a text-book on practical morals, the *Bhagavadgítá* is too brief. But it could scarcely be otherwise. The *Gítá* was not meant as a popular hand-book of morals

and has never been so used. It is intended, not so much for the neophyte, the beginner in spiritual endeavours, as for the adept, one who has made some progress in spiritual life.....However, though intended chiefly for the advanced seeker after spiritual truth, the *Gītā* is not without clear indications of the lines of practical conduct which one should follow on all important matters, and for laying down such lines it adopts the method of the division of *gunas* and its application to the moral life." (P. 378). "Having explained the different characters and effects of the *gunas* the author of the *Gītā* proceeds to ascertain the relative value of actions, sentiments and things according as they show a preponderance of either *sattvam*, *rajas* or *tamas*. (P. 380). Besides the trichotomy of *gunas*, our author employs a dichotomy of *sampat*, inheritance, of *daivi* and *asuri*,—the godly and demoniac,—adopting a rather Pharisiac tone and consigning the latter almost to eternal perdition, quite indefensible from whatever standpoint we consider it." (P. 388).

"Here then we have got all that the author of the *Gītā* has to say on practical morals. His brevity is excused by the fact that he has set a grand ideal before us, an ideal which, if steadily kept in view, will necessarily suggest the details of practical conduct. This ideal is nothing short of *Brāhma-Sthiti* or *Brahma-samsthā*,—establishment in God—acting from the divine standpoint, that is, in the same way as God would act if he were man." (P. 390).

CHAPTER X

Vaishnavism

Though admitting the importance and indecisive result of the controversy relating to the origin of the Bhāgavata Dharma, Pandit Tattvabhushan differs from those Orientalists who think that this monotheistic cult worshipping Bhagavat or Vāsudeva with its distinctive feature of *Bhakti* was different from the Brahmanāda of the Upanishads. The Pandit rejects the theory that the Bhāgavata Dharma took definite shape at the hands of Vāsudeva Krishna, because to him Vāsudeva was originally only a particular conception of God and not a person, and Krishna's historicity as a religious teacher is more than doubtful. He advocates the idea that in the Upanishads themselves there are two tendencies, we may call them theistic and pantheistic, which gave rise to two schools of Vedantic interpretation from the earliest times,—the schools which Rámánúja and Sankara followed and developed in later times. Tracing the origin of the Krishna cult to the Vedas he shows that Vishnu, of whom Krishna is said to be an *avatára*, was a solar deity, only another name of the sun. If any history is to be sought for Krishna as a warrior and religious teacher, one finds it in the non-Aryan heroic Krishna of the *Rigveda* and the Angirasa Krishna, author of some *Rik suktas*, presumably the same as the 'Devakí-putra' Krishna, the disciple of Ghora Angirasa, in the *Chhándogya Upanishad*. When introduced into the *Mahábhárata* he was at first perhaps

only a hero and politician. The *Gítá* is of course a later addition and the *avatára* is surely a very late development. As to the necessity of setting up an *avatára* the Pandit argues: "The secret of the spread of Buddhism must soon have been found out by the Bráhmanas. It was the position of Buddha as the central figure in his religion. The Sástras appeal only to the learned few; a person,—one realising to some extent at least the popular ideals of excellence,—appeals to all. Before the rise or popularisation of Krishna-worship the rapid progress of Buddhism must have deeply alarmed the leaders of Vedic society and set them thinking of the best way to stem the tide. Besides the other methods adopted, of which we need not speak, the setting up of a rival to Buddha must have commended itself as the most important. The Buddhist *Játaka* stories,—the stories of the numerous previous incarnations of Buddha,—must have suggested the incarnations of the most benign and popular of the Vedic gods,—Vishnu. And as Buddha was by birth a Kshatriya and by character a religious teacher, so was his rival, Krishna, conceived to be, though perhaps the warlike predilections of the epic poets made him more of a warrior than became his mission as a religious teacher. This seems to us to be the origin of the so-called Bhágavata Dharma, which was indebted not only for many of its teachings, but also for the conception of its central figure, to Buddhism. Krishna Vásudeva was not its author, but its product. Its author was that long line of thinkers who tried to grapple with the problems that had arisen in Vedic

society from the rise and spread of Buddhism in the country." (*Krishna and the Puranas* Pp. 34-36).

They found the solution in the Bhágavata Dharma, popularly known as Vaishnavism. It took many forms, but they are all ascribed to one fancied teacher, Krishna Vásudeva. "The earlier Vaishnavas," adds the Pandit, "knew he was not historical. To them as well as the wisest of their late followers, he was only the indwelling Logos, the Supreme Reason incarnate in man. Whatever therefore seemed true and beautiful to them—even what they considered expedient for the conservation of religion,—they ascribed to Krishna." (P. 36).

So much for Krishna, the supposed founder of Bhágavatism. His unhistoricity is dealt with by our author at some length in the first six essays of his *Krishna and the Puranas*. Now let us direct our attention to the philosophy, doctrines and practical *sádhanas* of Vaishnavism thus far developed by many hands since its inception in the *Mahábhárata*. "The Vishnu of the Puranas is the universe conceived as a person. This conception is purely Upanishadic ... What unreflective people conceive as dead matter is, in the enlightened vision of the Upanishadic seers, nothing but a form in which the Supreme Consciousness itself appears to us..... When this philosophic vision takes the form of poetry, it describes the world as an embodied person". (P. 37.) The writers of the Puranas make no secret of the fact that the representation of Vishnu as an embodied person with limbs and organs like those of a man is purely metaphorical." (P. 38.) This metaphorical exposition of Vishnu proceeds so far as

to interpret his wife Srí as only the inexhaustible glory of the Self and his bearer Garuda as nothing but the Vedas. But this Puranic conception of Vishnu is really the Vedic conception of Brahmá, Apara Brahman or Hiranyagarbha,—the first emanation from the Supreme Being. This supremacy of Brahmá perhaps continued up to the early Buddhist times. Then came the turn of Vishnu or Siva. Though Vishnu usurped Brahmá's place, his worshippers were not quite satisfied until they made him the Supreme Being himself, sometimes calling him *Nirguna*, sometimes *Saguna* Brahman. (Pp. 37-45). The Puranas are known to be Bhakti Sástras, thereby claiming an advance on the Upanishadic literature. Their most distinctive teaching by which to awaken *bhakti* in the human mind is the contemplation of the works of the incarnations of God, but the doctrine of incarnation is founded on the Vedantic idea of the unity of God and man. However, a true doctrine of *bhakti* cannot be founded on a purely monistic basis. A true philosophical basis of *bhakti* must have room in it for both Monism and Dualism. In the Puranas this basis is wanting, though later Vaishnava philosophers like Ramanuja, Madhva and Nimbara and notably those of the Chaitanya School of Bengal, have tried to formulate a doctrine of unity-in-difference as the true basis of *bhakti*. The doctrine of the imperishable existence of the individual in conscious unity with the Universal has no place in the Puranas. An ethical view of the world,—of its creation for a supreme end towards which it is gradually progressing—is conspicuously absent in these writings. From copious quota-

tions from the *Vishnu* and the *Bhágavata* Purana it is shown that their authors adhere to the doctrines of Máyáváda and Layaváda. (Pp. 32-55).

The *bhakti* or piety inculcated in the Vaishnava Puranas comes out best in the hymns of praise and prayer of which there are about fifty in the above mentioned books. Their most striking feature is Pantheism or Monism. The Puranas with all their crudities and extravagances see very clearly that unless God is seen to be all-in-all, the piety that can sacrifice everything for him is not possible. The second feature is their devotion to a special incarnation of the Deity. This doctrine is set forth not as opposed to but in harmony with that of God's general manifestation in the form of created beings. "But that the truth of God's personal relationship with individuals could not be taught except through the doctrine of special incarnation, shows that the immanence of God in man and nature was not seen by the composers of the Puranas with sufficient clearness". (P. 59).

However, the Vaishnavas classify *bhakti* into two general types, (1) that which consists in the realisation of God's *aisvarya* or glory and (2) that which consists in feeling his *mádhurya* or sweetness. It is in connection with the worship of special incarnations, particularly the worship of Krishna, that the latter type of *bhakti* is developed. And here we pass from the old to the new school of Vaishnavism. Says the Pandit in Lec. XIII of *Krishna and the Gítá* : "Even the *Bhágavata*, though it inaugurated a new era in Vaishnava history and was followed by innumerable works expound-

ing and expanding its ideal, failed to satisfy fully the sort of people for whom it was written, and was not indeed superseded but largely supplemented by works of a very different class. The *Brahma-vaivarta Purána*, and the *Nárada Pancharátra* seem to be the chief of this class of works. The earlier forms of these two books seem to be irrecoverably lost, and the forms in which we find them now appear to be very modern. However, they promulgate nothing short of a new species of Vaishnavism very different from the older Vaishnavism of the *Mahábhárata*, the *Harivamsa*, the *Vishnupurána* and even that of the *Bhágavata*. They seem to take their clue from two ideas only suggested but not developed in the *Bhágavata*. They are, first, that Krishna is not one of the many *avatáras*, incarnations, of God, but God himself in his fullness,—“*Ete chámsakaláh Pumsah Krishnas tu Bhagaván svayam.*” (Bh. 1. 3. 28), and secondly, that among the many *Gopí*s with whom Krishna disported in the Rásamandala at Brindábana, one was a special favourite. These two are made the central ideas in the later Vaishnava literature and are fully developed in it. In the earlier literature, Krishna is an incarnation of Naráyana or Mahá-vishnu, the Iśvara of the later Vedanta, the *Saguna* form of the *Nirguna* Para Brahman.....Later Vaishnavism rebelled against this idea of a partial incarnation of its God. Instead of one it brought in two Krishnas, corresponding to the *Saguna* and *Nirguna* Brahman. The *avatára* Krishna, he whose exploits are sung in the *Mahábhárata* and the literature founded thereon, is according to it the incarnation of Nárá-

yana, whereas the Absolute Krishna, who is sometimes called *avatárna*, to distinguish him from the *avatáras* or partial incarnations, is, has ever been, and will always be in Brindábana and Brindábana alone,—

‘*Brindábanam parityajya pádamekam na gachchhhti*’,— ‘He does not go a step beyond Brindábana.’” According to these Vaishnavas Krishna is eternally *sákára*, having a perfect male form and holding a lute with his two hands. Rádhá is a perfect model of the female form constantly associated with Krishna. The ideal of this type of Vaishnava *bhakti* is to be taken from men and women associated with the Lord in his *lilá*. It is of two kinds—*vaidhí*, expressed in the observance of certain forms of worship, and *rágánugá*, expressed in certain forms of love. “The latter is fivefold,” the Pandit continues, “according to the five *rasas* or feelings into which it finds expression, namely,—*sánta*, *dásya*, *sakhya*, *vátsalya* and *madhura*. The *sánta rasa* is simple reverence for the Lord leading to a life of piety and purity. It is the *bhakti* of such *jnánis* as Sanaka, Sananda, Sanátana and Sanatkumára. *Dásya* is the feeling that a faithful servant feels for his master. The best *sástric* model of *dásya bhakti* is Uddhava. Bhíshma, Bidura and Paríkshit may be mentioned as others of the same class. *Sakhya* is the feeling of a friend for a friend. Such a feeling and a relation to which it led is said to have existed between Krishna and such of the *gopas* as Sridáma, Sudáma and Subala and the five Pándava brothers, specially Arjuna, all of whom knew that their friend was the Divine Being himself. *Vátsalya* is the love of a parent for his or her child.

With reference to Krishna it is such a feeling as Nanda or Yasódá, Vasudeva or Devakí felt for him, a feeling arising from the consciousness—‘The Lord has become my child’. The *madhura rasa* is conjugal love. It is the feeling which the *gopīs* are said to have felt for Krishna. Krishna’s wives are also models of it, but the former are given precedence, for in their love for Krishna there was nothing of constraint or legal obligation,—it was altogether free and spontaneous. They are therefore said to be the best models of this form of piety, one that is said to be the highest conceivable”. (*Krishna and the Gítá*, Pp. 276-279).

However, the change to the doctrine of special incarnation transformed the form of worship into one of image-worship with material offerings. In the *Bhágavata*, at first contemptuous and concessive, this form of worship was at last prescribed and did a great disservice to the cause of religion. Because with the promulgation of the Rádhá-Krishna cult with its worship of images the true worship of God, the Absolute Spirit, practically ceased. Instead of spiritual exercises religion now consisted in the contemplation of Krishna’s amorous dealings with the *Gopīs*, thereby endangering morality also. As to the spiritual interpretation of the Rádhá-Krishna cult the Pandit says :— “Gravely questioning whether the story of an unholy love can be thus interpreted with any show of reason and without serious injury to the moral life of those who would accept such an interpretation, we yet do not deny the right of thus interpreting the Rádhá-Krishna story to those who are disposed to undertake it. But

one thing we are most anxious to emphasise, and that is that neither the authors of the Puranas nor their latter-day exponents and followers, including Chaitanya and his disciples, offer even the slightest clue to such an interpretation". (*Krishna and the Puranas* P. 93).

Bengal may be taken to be the most fruitful soil of the cult of the Brindábana Lílá and Srí Chaitanya its most thorough-going advocate, both theoretical and practical. He has set the highest example of impassioned love for God of which the emotionally rich Bengali nature is capable. In this respect he will ever remain our ideal. But the tendency in certain quarters to explain away his errors and harmonise his theological views with up to date liberalism has no sanction in fact. Nor have his theological teachings anything new to give over and above those of the later Puranas with their crudities. His *bhakti* teachings consisted in nothing more than the classification of *rasas* which he received from the earlier Vaishnavas and which we have already given in detail. *Mádhurya* is the *forte* of Chaitanya. In this respect the Bengal school of Vaishnavism introduces two peculiar features, first the superiority of *parakiyá* love and secondly, a strong desire of Krishna for the company of Rádhá—the highest model for a *bhakta* according to this teaching. "However", says the Pandit, "Chaitanya was a pure-hearted ascetic and did nothing in his life that may account for the moral degradation which has overtaken the sect founded by him. But his theology,—his idea of God as an embodied being unceasingly thirsting after enjoying the charms of a woman, and his ideal of

a *bhakta* as a woman ever seeking to make her lover happy by giving him the pleasure of union with her,—can it ever save any church from moral corruption?" (*Ibid* P. 97).

But it must be noticed that the origin of the Rádhá-Krishna cult is said to be supramundane. It is not a formless God that incarnated himself as a human being and did all these things in the mundane Brindábana, but the whole thing is a descent from above. This theme has been most elaborately described by Pandit Tattvabhusan in his *Krishna and the Puranas*, Essay XII. We give below only a few points. It is to be noted that the *Brahmavaivarta* Purana is the authority on the subject, but its authority was unceremoniously rejected by Upádhyáya Gauragovinda Ráy for obvious reasons. It fact the author is not a philosopher in any sense or degree, but merely a poet with a most sensuous imagination. However, Krishna, who is not an *avatára*, incarnation, but the Supreme Being himself, is described as living in Goloka, the highest heaven, with its Brindábana and Rásamandala, the originals of the earthly village and pleasure-ground bearing these names. From the body of Krishna the chief subordinate gods and goddesses issue whom we need not name and number here. Rádhá issued from Krishna when the latter was visiting Rásamandala in company with other gods. Rádhá from her very birth became his most favourite Gopí. Though the earlier Vaishnava poets made their Lord Krishna only a hair of Mahávishnu's head, this poet takes revenge on them by representing this deity as issuing from an egg produced by Rádhá. Now,

Krishna temporarily deserted Rádhá for the love of Virajá, another Gopí. This so much enraged Rádhá that she cursed Krishna to be born as a man because his licentious conduct was like that of man. Virajá turned herself into a river. Sridáma, a companion of Krishna, took Rádhá to task for her abusing her Lord and Rádhá forthwith cursed him to become a demon. As cursing is a privilege of the denizens of Heaven, Sridáma in his turn cursed her to appear as Ráyána's wife on earth, where fools would take her to be really so. In this way Rádhá's disgrace as a *parakíya* is sought to be removed. Other Gopís also are *chháyáh*, shadows, as wives of Gopas and such only in part, *kaláh*. However, when Krishna was only three years old, he enjoyed the full-grown Rádhá's company after her being secretly given in marriage to him by Brahmá in the right Vedic style, and after a hundred years they were reunited in Goloka.

The story is nauseating, but we insert it here for what it is worth.

CHAPTER XI

Christianity

Pandit Tattvabhushan has not written any book on Christianity ; but in three of his works,—*Hindu Theism*, *Krishna and the Gita* and *Theism of the Upanishads*,—he has written enough on the subject to justify our devoting a chapter of this book to stating his views on it. In the last chapter of the first mentioned book, that on “Hindu and Christian Theism Compared : the *Gita* and the Gospel”, he deals with Krishna and Jesus not as historical persons, “but as names that stand for certain teachings, philosophical and ethical,—for certain ideals of spiritual life which every man striving after the higher life must either accept or reject, and must therefore study and criticise.” As to the historicity of Krishna and Jesus he says, “So far as our study of the recent historical criticism of these works (the ‘*Gita*’ and the ‘*Gospel*’) goes,—and it does not go very far,—we believe Krishna and Jesus to be persons partly historical and partly mythical. though the one may be more or less historical than the other.” In *Krishna and the Gita* and *Krishna and the Puranas*, however, our author gives a more positive opinion about Krishna, probably as the result of deeper studies on the subject. In the first lecture of the former and the first six essays of the latter he tries to show that the epic and Puranic Krishna is purely imaginary. But as to Jesus, though he does not take such a view, he attaches less and less importance to the historical question and emphasises.

the value of both the *Gītā* and the New Testament as hand-books on practical religion, and not as histories or biographies. However, in his comparison of the *Gītā* and the Gospel he characterises the former's view of the relation of God and man and God and nature as more or less philosophical and the Gospel view as popular and uncritical. Nevertheless he thinks that "Jesus's faith in the paternal care and providence of God is deep and impressive, and his delineation of the love of him who watcheth the fall of every sparrow, numbereth the very hairs of our head, and rejoices over the return of the prodigal son, will move the generality of men far more than any philosophical doctrine of the essential unity of God and man." (P. 137).

This view is repeated in lecture ix of *Krishna and the Gītā* and the author's appreciation of the ethical teachings of Jesus given in *Hindu Theism* finds a deeper expression in the book. After quoting from the New Testament the parable of the Prodigal Son the Pandit says : "So, it is on a foundation of stone, namely that God loves every man with an infinite love, and is our common Father, that Jesus builds his twofold law of love to God and love to man. This cannot be said of systems which only vaguely feel after an impersonal substance at the basis of all life, and an impersonal law of *karma* holding all in an iron grip. Nor can it be credited to theories which, though teaching the personality of God, conceive him as absorbed in his own enjoyment and holding no parental relations with man. Such systems try in vain to make piety the guiding principle of life, and talk unmeaningly of the brother-

hood of man,—a brotherhood without a common Father. No system is less liable to this self-condemnation than Christianity". (Pp. 292, 293).

Referring to the idea of the Kingdom of Heaven the Pandit says : "The establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth seems to sum up this law (the law of love to man) and this idea clearly marks out Christian endeavours from those of other religions and explains the intense missionary and philanthropic activity of the followers of Christ. While other religions look up to a supra-mundane heaven,—conceived either as a locality or a spiritual condition,—as their goal, Christianity looks forward to the earth itself as the place where the kingdom of heaven is to be established. The details of the idea may be criticised, but the fundamental idea itself is grand and supremely true. There may be heavenlier and more abiding spheres of existence than this earth, but so long as it lasts, there can be nothing nobler for man than the endeavour to make it heavenly." (P. 294.)

"The spirit," continues our author, "in which man, even as regards his physical wants, is to be served, is brought out very clearly in the Gospel account of the last judgment. In this it is made evident that even the least of men is to be served as identified with Christ, the Son of God. This idea, notwithstanding the mythical and poetic imagery in which it is clothed, is so true and grand, that I extract at length the description which contains it. I quote it from Mathew." After making the extract the Pandit remarks : "The unity of God and man is here grasped

in a very practical manner, however little it may have been understood philosophically. If a choice had to be made between the mere intellectual recognition of this unity, leading only to devotional exercises characterised by emotional ecstasies, and this practical acceptance of it, which has changed the face of the earth so much for the better, there would be no doubt about the choice. But we are really called upon not to make a choice, but to combine the two and set up as our models both our own *jñánis* and *bhaktas* on the one hand and Jesus and his followers on the other." (Pp. 296, 297).

Coming to our author's treatment of the teachings of St. Paul and St. John, one notices that the philosophy he missed in the Gospel, specially the synoptic gospels, he finds, though in a somewhat crude form, in these apostles. He speaks at some length on Paul's contrast of 'flesh' and 'spirit', of 'faith' and 'work' and his teachings on man's redemption through faith in Christ's Crucifixion and Resurrection. He shows that Paul's 'faith' and 'work' are very much the same as Krishna's *jñána* and *bhakti* and that his 'flesh' and 'spirit' are our animal and spiritual natures between which a conflict is inevitable until the former has come completely under the latter's control. "Similarly the Resurrection typifies the birth of the higher life, the life of the spirit,—life in union with God. Crucifixion and Resurrection correspond to the *Gítá's* 'Brahma-nirvána' and 'Brahmasamsthá.' (P. 301). Again, "Faith like *jñána*, is the consciousness of unity with God, or in other words with Christ, who to St. Paul is one

with God. It is the consciousness that our true self is not our animal nature, with its desires, satisfactions, and sufferings, but the spirit of God in us, and that our salvation, our perfect sanctification, is eternally accomplished in him and does not depend upon any particular action on our part. Unless this is seen, no work availeth. All work without true faith is tainted by egotism,—by the false consciousness that I, an independent agent, am its doer. Such work, therefore, however holy on a superficial view, cannot bring about true salvation. The utter helplessness of man without God's power must be felt before salvation is possible. It must be felt that God's grace alone, and not anything that man can do, brings redemption. And when it comes, it is seen that it is through and through divine, that the old sinful self is entirely dead and a new self,—the spirit of God himself,—has taken its place. This truth the apostle expresses in the following among other passages of a similar import in his epistles: "I through the law died unto the law that I might live unto God. I have been crucified with Christ, yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." (P. 302).

As of St. Paul's so of St. John's views Pandit Tattvabhushan gives a somewhat lengthy exposition. In the light of Neo-Platonism* and the Vedantic distinctions

* Of this philosophical system and its influence on Christianity, as well as the most prominent of Medieval and Modern Christian Monists, Pandit Tattvabhushan gives an account in the third part of his *Advaitaváda, Práchya o Páschátya*.

of *Saguna* and *Nirguna* Brahman, and of *Brahman*, *Iswara* and *Brahmā*, he gives an exposition of the prologue to the fourth Gospel, which states the Greek and Christian doctrine of the Logos. By a reference to the long prayer which John ascribes to Jesus in his seventeenth chapter he also shows "that the divine sonship and unity with the Father claimed by Jesus are not incommunicable attributes, but that they are attainable by, or to speak more correctly, realisable as, the birthright of every rational being." (P. 331). In the course of this exposition our author shows the truth as also the mystery contained in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But this is better shown in the fifth and six lectures of his *Theism of the Upanishads*, to which we now draw the attention of the reader.

The last two lectures of the book are on "The Religious Aspect of Hegel's Philosophy" and "Hegel's View of Theism and Christianity". They have been appended to the preceding four on the Upanishads to show how akin Christian Idealism is to the religion of the Upanishads rightly understood. In the second of these lectures the Pandit says: "Hegel's Trinity is not the doctrine of three Gods but an exposition of three related aspects in the divine nature,—the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. This triune nature of God is revealed not merely to a chosen son or a small number of apostles, but to all who rise to the point of view of true reason. The insight into consciousness as the true Infinite, with its two finite moments of subject and object, is the manifestation

of God as the Holy Spirit to and in us. The finite intelligence, as an Other to whom God reveals himself, but who is nevertheless one with him, is the Son. But God exists even before or irrespectively of his manifestation to finite intelligence, containing it and the objective world within himself in an unmanifested form. As such he is the Father. 'The three forms indicated are', says Hegel, 'eternal Being in and with itself, the form of Universality (the Father); the form of particularization, Being for another (the Son); the form of the return from appearance into itself, absolute singleness or individuality (the Holy Spirit).'" (*The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. III. P. 2.)

Pandit Tattvabhushan gives some idea of Hegel's way of reaching the Trinity in the following words taken from the same lecture:—"Let us see what it is. In considering it we must remember how Hegel reaches God, the Infinite, the Absolute. The true Infinite is not anything beyond or outside the finite, it is implied in it. It is that which includes everything,—beyond which there is nothing. It is Consciousness, which differentiates itself into two finites, the subject and the object, but in this very act of distinguishing relates and unites them and thus reveals itself as the true Infinite, being in-and-for-itself, independent, not related to anything beyond itself and comprehending everything in itself. Time and space are not beyond but within it,—forms which it assumes; but which it also transcends. Finite consciousness, that is consciousness conceived as limited in time and space, is also included in it, being an appearance of which it is

the reality, or a reproduction of which it is the original. Thus the subject and the object, the finite and the infinite, are not distinct and independent realities, but related aspects of the same Reality. As related, they are one and yet different. Now, this is what the understanding, the mere logic of exclusion, cannot comprehend. It takes all distinctions as divisions. To it unity is only unity,—bare identity,—and difference only difference,—separation and division,—and there can be no such thing as unity-in-difference. To it a doctrine like the Trinity,—the unity-in-difference of Father, Son and Holy Spirit,—is a most irrational doctrine. As Hegel says, 'Those who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity are men who are guided merely by their senses and understanding.' (*Phil. of Rel.* vol. iii. p. 19). They say they can conceive an Infinite Being existing in and for itself without relation to anything else and without any internal relation. This is Absolute Monism, in which there is no room for an objective world or for finite intelligences, and in which they are set down as merely illusory. The understanding, in its popular form, believes in material things and finite minds and infers a God who has created them, but is no way one with them. According to Hegel neither the God of Monism nor that of Dualism is the true Infinite. Finite and Infinite are relative terms, and therefore an Infinite without relation to the finite is not only not the true Infinite, but is really meaningless. As Hegel says, 'Without the world God is not God.' (Vol. I. P. 200). The God of Dualism, as outside the finite and not including it, is limited by it and

therefore a finite God. In Hegel's opinion all religions rejecting the Trinity are vitiated by this logic of exclusion, which sees only the distinction, but not the unity of things. The doctrine of the Trinity, which is guided by reason or the logic of comprehension, alone sees unity and is the only Absolute Religion". (*Theism of the Upanishads*, Pp. 164-66).

We shall now close with Pandit Tattvabhushan's statement of Hegel's view of worship, which follows from his idea of the relation of God and man. The Pandit says: "As man's consciousness of his finitude reveals the Infinite in him, so does his consciousness of his own sinfulness, his moral imperfection, reveal the perfectly Holy, the perfectly Good, in him. In the purely animal nature, even in man so long as he is immersed in animality, attending only to his sensuous wants and pursuing only his sensuous propensities, there is no distinct consciousness of the Holy, the Good. But as conscience awakes in him and makes him conscious of an ideal of which his real falls short, he necessarily thinks of a Being in which his ideal is realised. In fact it is the presence of the perfectly Good in him that makes him conscious of a contradiction in his life, a contradiction between the *is* and the *ought to be*, and gives rise to a struggle in him to remove it. In Dualistic religion goodness is something to be created, produced, in man, and such goodness is never perfect. In the religion of Hegel, which recognises the essential unity of God and man, perfection exists in the ultimate Self, that is God, in a realised form, and man has only to see his unity with

God to attain it. This indeed implies a struggle, a long and in one sense an interminable struggle, but at every stage of this struggle the man of faith feels that he is not engaged in a fruitless effort at something which is unattainable, but that his liberation is sure and already realised in the Absolute, with whom he is ultimately one in spite of all his shortcomings. The animal, sensuous nature, which is the cause of his imperfection and the struggle it gives rise to, has only to be annulled, abrogated,—not in the sense of eradicating it, but in that of bringing it under the control of his higher, spiritual nature. And this can be done in perfection, and we can, even in our present embodied life, feel ourselves at one with the All-good. For the finite animal nature is after all a semblance, an appearance, and not a reality in the fullest sense. It is already annulled and abrogated in our higher Self. The man of true faith sees this and he also sees that to be really perfect, he has only to keep up the consciousness of his unity with the All-good. Higher and higher ideals of perfection will indeed go on revealing themselves to him in his journey through the life eternal, but as soon as he sees such an ideal, he also sees that it is already realised in his real Self and that the annulment of his animal nature, his narrow selfish desires, is already complete in that Self. The analogy of these teachings with the Vedantic teachings on liberation as not a *janya bastu*, a thing to be produced, but something eternally existing, though in a concealed form as it were in the Self,—something to be discovered rather than accomplished,—and on *jivan-mukti*, liberation

while still living the sensuous life, will be seen by those who are familiar with Vedantic literature. What we miss in ordinary Vedantists is the moral fervour which characterises Hegel and Christian philosophers generally." (*Ibid*, Pp. 170-172).

After this we may perhaps fitly conclude with the words with which Pandit Tattvabhusan closes his lecture on the "*Gitá* Ideal of *Bhakti* compared with the Christian Ideal" :—"We thus see that the essence of Christian teaching is in harmony with the fundamental teachings of our own sacred books, and that Christianity, inspite of the outlandish dress which so often hides its true character from us, has come to us not as an alien, but as a near kindred, always ready to help us, and as such deserves our hearty reception."

CHAPTER XII

Social Reform

What led a Bráhma to be a reformer ? The reply comes from the life of Raja Rammohan Ray. “ ‘Invite me to an idolatrous ceremony !’ said the great founder of the Bráhma Samáj to young Devendranath when he, on one occasion, went, deputed by his father, to invite the reformer to the Durgapuja celebration in his house. ‘Me’ ! the spiritual worshipper of the Invisible !’ What ancient reformer of India spoke with such fire and emphasis ? This ‘me’ ! rang in Devendranath’s ear all his life.” (*Philosophy of Bráhmaism*, P. 272).

The absence of this ‘ring’, “the atrophy of the moral sense,” is the real cause of our social degradation, not of Bengal only but of all India. “Individuality is so little developed in us that in this respect we are but little children, compared with the brave and robust races of the West. We habitually fear to differ with our neighbours, and when we do differ with them, we take good care to hide our differences. The Indian in fact never becomes socially independent. He is taught from his very infancy that religion consists in conforming to established usage. He is never taught to think freely or act freely. All freedom of action is systematically starved out and killed by the very economy of Indian homes and Indian society,—freedom of action, not only in matters religious, but in secular matters also.” (*Ibid*, Pp. 273-276).

In schools and colleges now-a-days one hears a great deal of conscience and free-thought, but one also

learns that he is not to take this teaching home to apply to domestic and social life. There he ever remains a slave of custom—he is unable to shake off the shackles forged by ignorant women and selfish priests. And the fear of unpopularity and excommunication holds him in their firm grip, turning him into a coward and a hypocrite. His conscience from long desuetude becomes all but extinct. The clarion call of Bráhmaism comes upon him to discard this double idolatry of custom and dead images. Those who surrender themselves to this call by establishing the kingdom of God over their whole lives become social reformers. The others, on the contrary, end their careers by losing whatever light they possessed. Darkness becomes their light. It is for this reason that the *Anánusthánic* Bráhma of today turns out the anti-Bráhma of to-morrow. There is no arguing with a hypocrite who would hide his light under a bushel. On the whole it can be said without any fear of contradiction that there is very little honest objection against the Bráhma ideal of social reform, which at the first instance is breaking away from idolatrous practice and then the removal of disabilities imposed on birth and sex.

One argument in favour of conforming to orthodox practices in the case of one who has lost faith in them is that by doing so one is better able to introduce reforms into the society of his kith and kin. To this the Pandit makes this trenchant reply: "This argument ignores the very first principle from which reform proceeds. That principle is, in the case in question, not that

the orthodox should practise heterodoxy, but that the heterodox, since orthodoxy has become so much error to them, should not practise it, but be true to their own convictions,—act up to the new ideal of life revealed to them. For the believer in idolatry idolatry is not a sin, but rather a duty. In practising it he follows only his idea of truth and right and cannot be blamed for doing so. The Theist may, and indeed should, in the best way known to him, try to lead the idolater away from his idolatrous belief and teach him the worship of the true God in spirit and in truth. But so long as one continues to be an Idolater in belief, the Theist should not call upon him to give up idolatrous practice. But very different is the case with himself. While idolatrous practice does not demean the Idolater, it is really demeaning and sinful to the Theist. To lay down, therefore, that as long as his idolatrous neighbour has not seen the error of his idolatry, the Theist should remain an Idolater in practice, is really to say that one should go on sinning and demeaning himself so long as his neighbour is not converted to his belief. But if the Theist can thus go on practising idolatry with the hope of some day joining hands with his idolatrous neighbour, it does not seem that it can ever be necessary for him to bring about his contemplated reform. If reform can be postponed in the case of the individual, why not also in the case of society? If it is proper for individuals to practise things they do not believe, why should it be improper for societies to do so? If we may practise and put up with hypocrisy for gene-

rations with the hope that *someday* we shall be in a position to put it away, does not the very necessity of putting it away cease?" (*Ibid* P. 260-621.) So this halting reformer cuts the branch on which he sits and becomes the object of contempt from all straightforward men. Instead of doing any real good to society his influence makes for impiety and dishonesty. Example teaches better than precept and by following *his* example people become so many hypocrites. On the other hand, the right thinking section of the community puts more faith on the thoroughgoing reformer than this halting aspirant after honour who earns only their contempt. Of course it is not meant that one is to leave one's society on any pretext, but as idolatry and caste lie at the very foundation of orthodox Hindu society, its progressive members cannot breathe and move freely there and by denying its fundamental principles they practically cease to be its members. "The establishment of a free and reformed society like the Bráhma Samáj is therefore a necessity, however painful this necessity may seem to some. If you call it an entirely new society, and the Bráhma daring innovators, they accept the honour or the censure implied in this judgment, though it may be shown that the fundamental principles of this society, the spiritual worship of God and the rejection of caste distinctions, are really Hindu principles in the sense that they are the teachings of scriptures universally honoured by the nation." (P. 286.)

In palliation of idolatry its symbolical character is sometimes urged. In reply it must be said that all gods

and goddesses cannot be symbols. Most of them are representations of historical and mythical persons. Some of them may be used as symbols, but popular notions about them are so very gross, that they serve no spiritual purpose. The examples of Christianity and Islam and of the old monotheistic sects of India, and lastly of the Bráhma Samáj show that idolatry is not necessary for our spiritual uplift, as the orthodox section would have it.

One other institution against which the Bráhma Samáj has declared war is caste, which has got a rude shock from the discovery that it did not exist in the earliest times and that its present form is of very recent origin, having come into vogue after the decay of Buddhism. Even at the present day it is not uniform in all parts of India. On the other hand the growing feeling of nationality has loosened its hold on the minds of the people and its entire abolition is only a question of time. Our democratic ideals in politics—the ideals of equality, fraternity and liberty, without which democratic aspirations are a mere hypocritical gibberish, are unrealisable unless caste notions are washed away from our minds. Classification may be allowed if it is based on qualification and occupation. But the classes should not be water-tight compartments disallowing interdining, intermarrying and interchange of professions. Otherwise the classes will in no time be transformed into rigid castes. And the redistribution of the numerous existing castes into the so-called four original castes according to *guna* and *karma* has this practical difficulty that there is no agency to carry out the plan

to-day or from generation to generation. Nor has the argument from heredity any force under the present Indian conditions. We are a mixed race and the same virtues or vices are consequently found in all the castes, high or low. And when the flood-gate of education has been thrown open to all castes, *gunas* that have developed among the individuals of the lower castes are on a par with, nay sometimes superior to, those of higher castes. As the Pandit says, "The fact is, heredity and individuality must both be taken into consideration. An individual is not a mere reproduction of his parents (or remoter ancestors). If he were so, there would be nothing in him more than there was in them.There are individuals and families in the so-called lower castes that can compare favourably with the best to be found in the so-called higher. Intermarriages among such people are not likely to do any harm to the parties. Whatever may have been our differences in the past, a common system of education is now happily levelling up these differences and raising us to a moral platform from which love, sympathy, co-operation and unity appear to be things higher and more valuable than all other things. If, therefore, the so-called higher castes of our people were even to lose certain of their long acquired excellences in contracting marital unions with the so-called lower castes, the gains of such unions would be incomparably greater than the losses. In the place of a nation torn by internal feuds, though containing sections advanced in a lower and outward sense, such unions would lay the foundation of a united nation strong in the genuine

strength of love and brotherly sympathy. We already realise the blessings of such union in miniature in our Bráhma religious gatherings, in which a common living religion, the highest of all unifying factors, obliterates all distinctions and makes us embrace men of all castes and grades of society as brethren. When will such blessed unity pervade all classes and ranks of Indian society? When will those pernicious distinctions which are sapping the very life-blood of our nation be at an end and India rise as a strong united nation fit to fulfil the high destiny which Providence has ordained for her? There cannot be a surer truth than this, my friends, that that high destiny cannot be fulfilled without the utter destruction of the supreme root of all our social evils—the caste system." (Pp. 304-306).

By accepting Act III of 1872 the Bráhma Samáj introduced a number of reforms which permanently improved the status of women and which are now going to be the *Sanatan Dharma* of the country at large, however strong might have been the opposition to them at their introduction. This one single act has emancipated women in all senses of the term. First, it has done away with child-marriage, the mother of a lot of social evils. Without alluding to the physical deterioration it causes to the race, one may say that child-marriage turns the fair sex into chattels in the matter of the marital union. Again, the law has opened the way to a woman's free choice of a husband. As the consent of both the parties is required, the social position of women has been equalised with that of men. By increasing the age of marriage facilities for higher

education have been increased and the parent society has not failed to take advantage of these facilities. In Bráhma marriages the bride is not treated as a material object to be disposed of at the sweet will of the guardian, but a responsible personality as much as the groom. Her free personality has been once for all acknowledged both in letter and spirit. It has removed one of the greatest acts of injustice done to women by man-made law, as it permits the widow to marry again if she so chooses. This form of marriage altogether abolishes caste distinctions, about which we have said a great deal already. It has done away with polygamy, one of the greatest blots of human character. "Under no condition whatever," as the Pandit points out, "whether it be change of faith, the absence of issue or the invalidism of one of the parties, is polygamy or polyandry possible according to its provisions." (P. 324).

After relating what valuable contributions the Bráhma Samáj has made to the spread of female education in Bengal the Pandit remarks : "In fact it (the Bráhma Samáj) has been the chief factor during the last half a century and more in the progress of Indian women, and it is decidedly the foremost of all Indian communities in social progress, excepting perhaps the native Christian community. (P. 334.) He then makes the following observations on the progress of female emancipation : "I believe that Indian women are under a thraldom at least as real and abject, (if not more) as our political subjection to the British and that the one as urgently calls for remedial measures as the other.

Our love for our mothers, sisters and wives often effectively hides from us the reality of their social slavery to us, just as the benevolent tendency of British rule for several generations long hid from our view, and still hides from many eyes, the reality of our political slavery. It is sad to contemplate that the Bráhma Samáj has done so little to break the fetters which bind women, though by promoting their education it has no doubt laid the foundation of future progress in this matter. The Sádháran Bráhma Samáj has also proved its faithfulness to one of the fundamental principles of Bráhmaism—‘*Nara nári sádháraner saman adhikár*’,—men and women have equal rights,—by laying open all its high offices, including that of ministers, to women.” (P. 334.) Then the Pandit, referring to the wave of social reaction in the country which cripples our reforming activity, says that bolder spirits have no obstacles in their way and that the freedom of women follows logically from the essential principles of Bráhmaism. And the Bráhma have, he adds, a special duty in this respect. To those who think that, however educated, women will never be fit for complete liberty, the Pandit opposes the irrefutable argument that this is also the position of British Imperialists who argue that so far as their prophetic eyes go Indians will never be fit for self-determination. “But such arguments,” the Pandit continues, “are evidently vitiated by as palpable a bias in the one case as in the other. It is the bias of organised selfishness in both the cases and of an additional moral cowardice in the former. To earnest, unbiassed people, it must be evident that

women, equally with men, have the right of free, that is, liberal, all-round education, free movement and free livelihood." (P. 336.) As to the first of these three rights of women the Pandit is of opinion that we, Bráhmas, have recognised it only very imperfectly. With regard to free movement we have not gone more than one step in advance of orthodox Hindu society and our Bráhmikás lag far behind the orthodox Hindu women of Bombay and Madras. As to the other liberty, that of free livelihood, the Pandit thinks it a great desideratum under the present circumstances. Teachership and the medical profession, now open to our women, are no solution for this pressing problem. "It therefore behoves the more thoughtful members of the Bráhma Samáj," the Pandit urges, "to give up their apathy in regard to this matter and devise a scheme of free livelihood for our women, both in the interest of their true spiritual progress and of their temporal comfort and happiness." (Pp. 338-339.)

Since the Pandit wrote, some tangible progress has taken place both in the Bráhma Samáj and the old society in all the matters mentioned above, and public opinion, specially in educated circles, has so far advanced as to have made it possible for the Sarda Bill, which suppresses child-marriage throughout the country, to pass.

SOME WORKS AND PUBLICATIONS BY
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10. THE BHAGAVADGITA in Devanagar characters, with Sanskrit annotations and English translation by the Editor and Pandit Srischandra Ray Vedanta-bhushan, B. A., and an introduction by the Editor containing an expository and critical account of the contents of each chapter. ~~ৱৰ্তৰ~~. Chakravarti, Chatterji & Co.
11. ব্রহ্মজিতাসা—ব্রহ্মবাদের দার্শনিক প্রমাণ ও ব্যাখ্যা। পরিবর্কিত দ্বিতীয় সংস্করণ। মূল্য ৫০ আনা।
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